The Warrior Pharaoh Rameses Ii And The Battle Of Qadesh

m

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M ft was in the fifth year of his reign that the Pharaoh
Rameses f / engaged the army of the Hittite king
Muwatallish at Qadesh an the Orontes in (me oj the
grea t ha tiles of an t i qu i ty. Ch a racte rized by r th e cl ash
of masses of chariots, it was also the high-water mark
of the form of warfare practised during the Late
Bronze Age in the Ancient Near East . The Egyptians
and Hit tiles were the foremost exponents of chariot
warfare at this time , and Qadesh was notable for the
manner in which both sides sought to impose their will
upon the other by the employment of distinctive chari-
ot tactics that had evolved over some centuries. This
could not be better shown than in this relief from the
Ph a ra o h V fun era ry temp L\ kn o wn a s t h e Ra t neseu tn

at Thebes. On the left of the register can he seen the
l igh ter, two -man Egyptian cha riots with the heavier*
three-man chariots of the flit rites shown on the right .
Once Pharaoh V forces had rallied, following the sur-
prise Hittite attack, and contained the weight and
power of the close-combat tactics of their chariot ry, the
crews of the rapid-manoeuvring Egyptian machines
were able to employ their powerful composite bows to
execute fearful destruction among the slower-moving
Hit t it e ra n ks , /// / h is way * wh a t a ppea red i 1 1 it i a l ly 1 a s a
remarkable Hittite strategic triumph at Qadesh may
have been transformed, on the battlefield, into a tacti-
cal Egyptian victory.

▲ Tell Nebi-Mend, the
ancient Qadesh (Hittite
Kinza) on the Orontcs.
Dominating the skyline ,
it is seen here from the
eastern side and gives a
view of the site as seen
from the Hittite perspec-
tive. Beyond lies the
plain on which the battle
was fought. Its extent and
eminent suitability for
the employment of
massed chariots can be
clearly seen and goes
some way to supporting
the view that Qadesh was
a designated arena for the

great contest of arms
between the Nilotic
empire and that of Hat ti.
Rameses * camp would
have lain out of sight
beyond the tell. The Hit-
tite chariot assault ,
whatever its strength ,
would have been
launched to the south of
the tell which is on the
left of the picture .
(P.Parr)

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Also published as Campaign 22
Qadesh 1300BC

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for Osprey Publishing Ltd.

Colour bird’s eye view illustrations by
Peter Harper.

ll’argamtng Qadesh by Ken AntelifT
W argames consultant Duncan Vfac-
farlanc.

Cartography by Micromap.

Mono camerawork by M&L Repro-
ductions, North Cambridge, Essex.
Printed in China through World Prim Ltd

FRONT COVER: Bust of Rameses 11.

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BACK COVER: The basic inventory of
weaponry used by Egyptian infantrymen.

CONTENTS

Acknowledgements
The framework for this text draws
heavily on the interpretation of
Qadesh suggested by the Egyptologist
Mans Gocdickc. Ilis is the only
account of the ‘battle’ that I find
remotely credible; responsibility for
the flesh on the skeleton, however, is
mine as arc any errors. 1 wish to thank
Christine cl Vlahdy for her encour-

agement, help and freely given time
spent listening to the mcandcrings of a
non Kgyptologist, and Mr Peter Parr
of the Institute of Archaeology , Uni-
versity College London, who so very
kindly proffered valuable information
concerning the battle site, and allowed
me to use photographs taken during
his many \cars of excavations at
Qadesh

Introduction

6

Syria: Arena of the Middle Fast

9

Amurru: The Strategic Method

11

Suppiluliumas the Great

12

The Campaigns of Seti I

15

Raineses 11 and Muwatallish

19

The Opposing Armies

21

The Might of Hatti

21

Pharaoh > Army and State

27

The Rameside Army

30

The Field Army

32

The Combat Arms

35

Organization: The Infantry

37

The Chariotry

39

The Battle of Qadesh

44

Deception

45

What of the Hittites?

53

The Advance of P’Re

53

Combat is Joined

55

The Hittite Assault

57

Excursus One

64

The Hittite Second Wave

75

Excursus Two

80

Aftermath

83

Chronology

89

A Guide to Further Reading

91

Wargaming Qadesh

92

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INTRODUCTION

ll is a measure of the fascination exerted by the Bat-
tle of (Jadesh that nearly three and a quarter millen-
nia after the event it still excites the interest of
scholar and layman alike. That this should be so is
not surprising. This clash of arms was the penulti-
mate act of a drama whose initial scenes were played
out during the great power conflicts and rivalries
that characterized the contest for the mastery of
Syria in the Ancient Near East during the 14th and
13th centuries BC. It is the stuff of the waxing and
waning of empires, and of kings who bestrode their
time as colossi, ultimate practitioners of a form of

► During the second half of the second millennium the
Ancient Near East witnessed a prolonged and some-
times hitter contest between the great powers of the day
as they vied for control of Syria. During that period
the kingdom of Egypt had retained a consistent interest
in the region, contending first with the Kingdom of
Mitanni and, from the mid 14th century onwards, its
Anatolian successor, the Hitt it e empire. Although driv-
en by more particular national interests, all three king-
doms shared a common desire to control the region in
order to exploit its great material wealth and the
i m n tensely p t o Jit a hie i n te m a t io n a l f m d e th a t t urn ed
Syria into the crossroads of the Ancient World . The
Nilotic kingdom had always had a major interest in
the region and evidence of trade with By bios extends as
far hack as the 1st Dynasty. However, the defining fea-
ture of Egypt y s interest in the Levant during the New
Kingdom period (c. 1565-1 085) arose in the wake of the
expulsion of the Hyksos invaders in the f 6th century
The development of a defensive military strategy that
saw the projection and maintenance of Egyptian mili-
tary power as far north as Syria was perceived as the
best means of ensuring the security of her eastern bor-
ders . Although military power was the basis of Egypt's
imperialism in Canaan and the Levant , throughout the
New Kingdom it was always a minimalist policy. The
prime concern was to ensure the regular payment of
tribute from the vassal states within the empire and as
long as this continued the Nilotic rulers maintained a
loose rein over their Asiatic provinces. The petty states
within the ‘empire* were free to conduct their own

warfare soon to be eclipsed with the onset of the age
of iron.

Qadesh is ihe earliest bailie in ihe history of
mankind whose course can be reliably reconstructed
in detail. It has in consequence been frequently
described in many works on warfare and ancient
history. A notable feature of these many narratives is
that they offer a fairly uniform picture of the battle.
These accounts nearly all share a generally uncriti-
cal, almost literal reading and acceptance of the
veracity of the Rameside sources and their transla-
tions wherein concerns for philological exactitude

internecine wars , But their allegiances were fickle.
When strong military demonstrations were not forth-
coming to remind them of where their loyalties lay,
they schemed with Egypt ’$ enemies to overthrow the
yo ke o fp h a ra o ft . First M t ta n ni and la t er Hatti so ugh t
to undermine Egyptian power in central Syria, Where
ill-defined or contested boundaries between the spheres
of interest of these powers in this vital region led to
instability, therein lay the opportunity for vassal king-
doms to stir up trouble by playing off one power
against the other . The prolonged military campaigning
ofTuthmosis III in northern Syria was designed to
ensure permanent Egyptian control of the region, but
this could not be maintained because Syria was more
than 600 miles from the Nilotic kingdom . I he perma-
nent and substantial military presence required to pre-
serve a firm Egyptian grip on the region was not a price
she was prepared arable to pay. Resolution of the long-
drawn-out conflict with Mitanni by treaty in the reign
ofTuthmosis IV defined the borders between the two
empires and provided three generations of peace. With
the overthrow of Mitanni by the Hit tiles in the mid
14th century the problem once more revived. The reti-
cence of the later pharaohs of the 18th Dynasty to use
military power in Syria saw Egyptian influence and
territory slip away in the face of II if tit e gains. But
with the accession of the 1 9th Dynasty there was begun
a new policy, predicated on revived military power
that sought to strengthen Egypt's control over her Asi-
atic possessions and eventually recover the lost ' lands
of central Syria.

6

INTRODUCTION

have taken precedence over reconstructions of the
battle ill at take seriously the contingencies of war-
fare in the Late Bronze Age* As this ‘Campaign’
Lille will argue for a different understanding of what
occurred at (^adesh by considering seriously such
matters, it is necessary by way of an introduction to
offer a resume of the traditional accounts of the bat-
tle. This will allow the reader to gain an apprecia-
tion of how the critical analysis and account con-
tained herein leads to a markedly different interpre-
tation of the events that occurred in Syria more than

three thousand years ago.

In essence an iteration of the accounts that are
presented in most texts tell the following story: The
army of Rameses II advanced upon the city of
Qadesh in four corps. Pharaoh was with the corps of
Amun, which was in the van of the Egyptian army.
While crossing the River Orontes to begin the
approach to the city from the south, two bedouin
tribesmen in the employ of Ilatti led the gullible
Rameses to believe that the I Iittite army was many
miles away to the north. Rameses, believing he had

/ KIZZIJWADNA

EGYPT

The Contest for Syria

KARKISA

Troy SEHA RIVER W|LUSA

ARZAWA

RHODES

Hattusas
HATH

PITASSA

HITTITE EMPIRE

& GASGA LANDS

URSHU

\ Van B

,

NAHARIN % \
(MITANNI) X

x **

Nineveh* ^

V Assur

w n • #

1/ \ v /

•/Carchemish

ALASIYA

Mediterranean Sea

Tuntp#^ 1 J
Sinnyra* Qarifisjj/'

N * ^

Byblos*/^ S YR|A

Sidon # # 9 Damascus
Tyre#

Megiddo#

Bath-Shar?

# M 0 AB
Ga2a * -V Dead

Cj Sea

Dtir-Kungalzo*

Babylon* ^
%

Arabian Desert

Pr-Rameses _ si i e

(Avaris)* LOOM

Memphis •Heliopolis

• SINAI

_ Maximum extent of Egyptian rule;
reign ot Tuthmosis I c. 1520 BC

Empire of Mittani c, 1480 RC

Hittite Empire c . 1350-1300 BC

Extent of Egyptian rule;
reign of Rameses II c. 1300 BC

300 Miles

7

INTRODUCTION

stolen a march on the Hittite king Muwatallish and
therefore secured the strategic advantage over his
enemy, ordered Amun forward and on to the city
without further ado. Having established camp to the
north-west of Qadesh, Pharaoh was then mightily
unnerved to discover that not only had the Hittite
army already arrived, but was even then drawn up
for battle and hidden behind the great mound on
which Qadesh was built.

Having dispatched his Vizier to hurry on the sec-
ond corps of P'Rc (The Re), it was then ambushed

A Regarded by many as
the greatest of all the
pharaohs of Egypt f Tuth -
mosis III (1504-1450)
carved out the Egyptian
Empire in Canaan and
the Levant, Under his
aegis the Egyptian army
became the greatest war
8

machine of its time and
the Nilotic kingdom the
foremost power of the age.
II is achievements spurred
the martial ambitions of
the young Rameses II who
desired to emulate those
of his great 1 8th- Dynasty
forebear.

as it marched across the Plain of Qadesh. The entire
corps disintegrated in panic as a force of 2,500 Hit-
tite chariots, which had been lying in wait, crossed a
ford of the Orontes and hurled itself at the Egyptian
column. The Hittite host then turned north and
attacked Amun’s camp. Many of the Hittites, having
broken through the shield wall, succumbed to the
lure of the booty of the camp. As with P’ Re, many of
Amun's troops panicked and abandoned Rameses to
his fate. Pharaoh, however, donning his armour,
leapt into his chariot and then almost single-hand-
edly held off the Hittite chariotry, inflicting heavy
losses on them. The Hittite monarch, overlooking
the battlefield and surrounded bv his uncommitted
infantry, ordered a further 1,000 chariots to the aid
of the first wave who now, because of the valour of
Rameses, were in a dire predicament. Just as the
Hittite reinforcement reached the camp, Pharaoh
was saved by the arrival of the Ne’arin. These were
a body of troops that, earlier on, unbeknown to the
Hittites, Pharaoh had detached from the main body
of the Egyptian army and ordered to approach
Qadesh from the north. With their arrival Rameses
was able to see off the Hittite attack. Many high-
ranking Hittite and allied warriors lay dead on the
plain and many more were chased into Qadesh or
suffered the humiliation of having to swim across
the Orontes to escape the wrath of Rameses. Some
accounts see the combat as having continued into
the second day, but as a consequence of the bravery
of Pharaoh and the dire losses among the Hittite
chariotry, Muwatallish offered Rameses a truce on
the following day. This accepted, the two armies
withdrew to their homelands.

Such are the essential elements of the Battle of
Qadesh as commonly presented. While this account
will accept much of the above as a framework, there
are more than a few anomalies in the Rameside
sources to be addressed. When these are explored
from a military rather than linguistic perspective
they offer the possibility of a different account of
the Battle of Qadesh. Such an account requires an
appreciation of the antecedents of this battle, how-
ever, and these are to be found on the wider stage of
the complex international politics of the great pow-
ers of the day and the relations with their lesser but
duplicitous vassal kingdoms in the Ancient Near
East.

SYRIA: ARENA OF THE MIDDLE EAST

Syria: Arena of the Ancient Near East

The prolonged interest of ihe great powers of the
Ancient Near East in Syria derived from their
respective desires to dominate and exploit ihe eco-
nomic resources and trade of ihe region. During
this period Syria was the crossroads of world com-
merce, Goods from the Aegean and beyond entered
the Near East via ports such as Ugarit, whose ships
dominated maritime trade in the eastern Mediter-
ranean. Underwater excavations of Late Bronze Age
ships such as that discovered near Cape Gdidonya
off the south coast of Turkey, show the remarkable
range of goods they carried — copper, tin, chemi-
cals, tools, glass ingots, ivory, faience, jewellery, lux-
ury goods, timber, textiles and foodstuffs. This mer-
chandise was then distributed throughout the Near
East and beyond by a network of extensive trade
routes. From the east and south, these same land
routes were used by merchants who brought raw
materials such as precious metals, tin, copper, lapis
lazuli and other merchandise from as far afield as
Iran and Afghanistan to trade in the emporia of
Syria. With its inherent fertility and richness in nat-
ural resources, Syria therefore offered much to
predatory powers seeking to use such wealth for
their own benefit. Thirty-three centuries ago
'world’ power was synonymous with the control of
Syria, so it is nor surprising that for nearly two hun-
dred years the 'great powers’ of Egypt, Mitanni and
Hatti expended much blood and treasure in wars
designed to ensure their respective control of this
vitally strategic region. While this provides the
backdrop to general great power motivation in
Syria, it is possible, within this wider context, to
identify a more specific sequence of events that was
to culminate in the Battle of Qadesh,

In the first half of the 14th century the Hittite
kingdom under its vigorous monarch Suppiluliumas
began a systematic and highly successful demolition
of" the position of the Kingdom of Mitanni in north-
ern Syria. The immediate fallout was the unravel-
ling of the international status quo that had obtained
in the region since the peace treaty between Egypt
and the Kingdom of Mitanni concluded during the
reign of Tuthmosis IV (1425-17) some two genera
tions before. Indeed, it had been an earlier if fitful
revival of the power of the Anatolian kingdom that

had prompted the rapprochement between the two
rival powers after many decades of warfare in Syria.
It was a treaty that served the interests of both pow
ers at the time. For Egypt, notwithstanding the
prodigious military efforts of Tuthmosis III and his
son Amenophis LI, had witnessed a progressive loss
of ground to Mitanni in the region. Mitanni, in the
wake of the revival of her near and powerful Anato-
lian neighbour, faced the very real prospect oi a
two-front war. Pondering the alternatives, Saussatar,
King of Mitanni, determined to eliminate his south-
ern front by approaching the Nilotic kingdom with
a formal offer of ‘brotherhood 1 that would secure a
cessation of hostilities in Syria and conclude an
alliance between Mitanni and Egypt. There was
every reason to believe that such a treaty would be
perceived as being in Egypt’s interest. Sometime
alter year ten of Amenophis IPs reign, the Chiefs
of Mitanni came to him, their tribute upon their
backs, Lo seek the peace of his majesty’.

The treaty was finally concluded in the reigns of
the respective successors of the two kings, when
Tuthmosis TV married the daughter of Artatama of
Mitanni. The most significant matter agreed by
both parties was ihe clear demarcation ot the bor-
ders between the two empires in central Syria.
While no copy of ihe ireafy itself has yet been recov-
ered, the specific details of the boundaries can be
inferred from later documents (see map on page 10).
It did, however, recognize Egypt’s claim to Amurru,
the strategically vital Eleutheros valley and (Qadesh.
The formalization of these borders entailed the
Egyptians surrendering claims to territories thai
had once fallen within their imperial domain by
virtue of the conquests of Tuthmosis I and III. In
essence the boundaries finally a. greed corresponded
to those of Egypt and Mitanni extant on the death
of Amenophis II. Their real significance for the
Nilotic kingdom lay in the manner whereby during
the next two hundred years, down to the time of
Rameses II, they became impressed on the Egyptian
mind as permanent and fixed. Indeed, the percep-
tion that these borders marked the true boundaries
of the Nilotic empire meant that Egypt would in all
likelihood cake strong measures against any power
encroaching upon them.

In the decades that followed, Mitanni and Egypt
reaped the dividends of this prolonged peace, Dur-

9

INTRODUCTION

10

AMURRU: THE STRATEGIC MARCHLAND

ing this period the wealth and prosperity of New 1
Kingdom Egypt reached its apogee. Tribute poured
in from her Canaanite possessions and the secure
borders with Mitanni allowed for the unimpeded
movement of goods along the trade routes. For three
decades this relative tranquillity lasted, with the
whole of the Fertile Crescent seemingly at peace as a
consequence of the great power axis of Egypt,
Mitanni and Kassite Babylon.

Amurru: The Strategic Marchland

To access their central Syrian dependencies on the
Orontes from the ports on the coast the Egyptians
depended upon the land corridor provided by the
Eleutheros valley which ran through the territory
known colloquially as ‘Amurru’. In times past Egyp-
tian armies had marched through the Eleutheros
valley before embarking upon their assault on
Mitanni’s possessions in northern Syria. While the
strategic importance of this route could not be
denied, its retention in Egyptian hands hinged in
turn on the Nilotic kingdom’s possession of the city
of Qadesh on the Orontes. Qadesh was so placed
that not only did it dominate the western end of the
Eleutheros valley, but it also lay astride the main
Egyptian invasion route to the north Syrian plain.
Any attempt to bring northern Syria within the bor-
ders of the Nilotic empire presupposed Egyptian
possession of Qadesh. Following the peace treaty

M The most important
aspect of the treaty that
concluded the 'brother-
hood' between F.gy'pt and
Mitanni was the clear
demarcation of their
respective imperial bor-
ders in Syria . Although
acceptance of this line
required Egypt to forego
her claim to cities and
territories (see area on
map) that had fallen
within the domain of her
rule during the reign of
Tuthmosis III and
Amenophis //, she had in
reality been losing ground
to Mitanni in these
regions for some time .

This clear demarcation
allowed Egypt to eschew
the need for military
demonstrations to con-
vince her Syrian vassals
of continued loyalty as
both powers agreed not to
undermine their respec-
tive spheres of influence.
As a consequence no
Egyptian army cam-
paigned in Syria for some
sixty years following the
treaty's conclusion. This
stability was only under-
mined when the Hittites
proceeded to destroy the
position of Mitanni in
northern Syria.

with Mitanni, Egypt’s perception of these posses
sions in such terms faded as her rulers reconciled
themselves to the loss of the former north Syrian
territories. However, it followed that if at any time in
the future Egypt should revive her imperial aspira
lions in that region, their strategic significance
would once again come to the fore. It was the
importance of Qadesh and Amurru and their
respective ownership that was to become the spur to
the ultimate conflict between Egypt and Hatti.

It was the precision with which the territories of
Mitanni and Egypt were formally demarcated by
treaty that accounted for the longevity of the peace
between the two powers. The settlement of vassal
ownership of the border kingdoms removed the
potential sources of conflict between the two
empires. But the emergence of a nascent political
entity calling itself ‘Amurru’ during the reign of
Amenophis 111 caused no little difficulty for both
Egypt and Mitanni. Although regarded as a nominal
Egyptian possession, Amurru was not perceived by
either empire as a legitimate kingdom for it had not
existed at the time the peace treaty was concluded.
Nevertheless, under the strong leadership of the
dynamic figure of one Abdi-Ashirta and later his
son Aziru, the disparate inhabitants of the region
acquired a measure of political coherence that had
enabled them, by the end of the 14th century, to cre-
ate a kingdom that occupied all the lands between
the Mediterranean Sea and the Orontes valley.
There can be no doubting that Abdi-Ashirta and his
son were both wily, politically ingenious, but self-
serving individuals. While outwardly professing loy-
alty to his overlord Amenophis III in Egypt,
Abdi-Ashirta nevertheless took advantage of the
Nilotic kingdom’s relative indifference to its imperi-
al possessions to expand his kingdom. The lack of
an effective Egyptian military presence in the region
allowed Abdi-Ashirta to impose his will on sur-
rounding territories, some of whom appealed in vain
to Egypt to help them fight this local strongman.

It is a measure of the difficulty Amurru caused the
great powers that Mitanni deemed it necessary to
take military action to control this nominally Egyp-
tian ‘vassal’. Egypt did eventually bestir itself and
sent a military expedition, and the problem of
Amurru was temporarily removed by the death of
Abdi-Ashirta, but matters on the wider stage now

M

INTRODUCTION

M While it is now clear
that the Egyptian empire
in the Levant did not
crumble during the reign
of Amenophis l / , better
known as Akhenaten
( 1353-35 ), important ter-
ritories were lost to the
revivified Hittite empire
under its dynamic king
Suppiluliumas. These
were the city of Qadesh on
the Orontes , an Egyptian
possession since the days
of Amenophis IL and the
stra tegica l ly im port a n t
march la nd of A m urru.

proceeded to bring to an end the gencrations-long
accord between Egypt and Mitanni and in the pro-
cess create the conditions for the revival of Amurru.

Suppiluliumas the Great

It is not the place here to examine in detail the Hit-
tite takeover of northern Syria, but rather to see how
the consequences arising therefrom affected the
relations between Egypt and Haiti and how in turn
these would culminate in the Battle of Qadesh.

The accession of Suppiluliumas can only be dated

12

to approximately 1380. That he came to the throne
determined to assert the Hittite claim to Syria
seems certain, as hostilities with Mitanni broke out
shortly thereafter. In his first Syrian campaign he
conquered the states of Aleppo, Alalakh, Nuhashshe
and Tunip in northern Syria. An attempt by Mitan-
ni in the following decade to reassert her power
among her former vassals, now linked by treaty to
Hatti, was utilized by the Hittite monarch as a casus
belli and the second Syrian war was launched.
Declaring the former Mitannian vassal kingdoms to
be rebels, Suppiluliumas crossed the River

SUPPILULIUMAS THE GREAT

Euphrates into the land of Ishuwa, marched directly
south and, having totally surprised Mitanni,
attacked it directly and in a very rapid campaign
occupied and sacked the capital Washukkanni.
Turning west, the Ilittite monarch recrossed the
Euphrates and entered Syria, his true objective, to
the south of Carchemish.

With the power of Mitanni vanquished, the states
of Syria fell to him one after the other. Suppiluliu-
mas lists them as Aleppo, Mukish, Niva, Arakhtu,
Qatna and Nuhashshe (see Map 3). Egypt had also
seen slip from her control the great trading city of
Ugarit and the vital strategic possession of Qadesh.
That this could occur without any military response
by the Nilotic kingdom is worthy of some consider-
ation. The failure of Pharaoh to come to the aid of
his erstwhile ally is often cited as evidence of the
disinterestedness of Amenophis IV (hereinafter
Akhenaten) in his Asiatic empire. From the vantage-
point of El Amarna, however, matters were not per-
ceived in that way. Notwithstanding her treaty obli-
gations the early years of Akhenaten’s reign had seen
a cooling of relations with Mitanni. It mattered little
to Egypt who occupied northern Syria as long as the
borders with the Nilotic kingdom were respected.
On that matter it would seem that the wily I Iittire
monarch had made clear beforehand that his cam-
paign was directed solely against Mitanni and its
Syrian dependencies.

Indeed, the Hittite occupation of Qadesh had not
been intended but followed upon the unilateral
attempt by the king of Qadesh, operating as he
believed in the interests of his Egyptian overlord, to
block the Hittite advance southwards. Having been
defeated in battle and the city taken, the leading
men of Qadesh, including its king and his son
Aitakama, had been carried off to Hattusas. A sig-
nificant possession now lay in Hittite hands and its
retention or otherwise would be regarded by Egypt
as the litmus test of Hatti’s true intentions. The
return of Aitakama seemed to demonstrate the
veracity of the Hittite claim to have no design on
Egyptian territory, particularly as he was able to
renew Qadesh' status as a vassal of Egypt. Within a
short time of his being installed as ruler of Qadesh,
however, Aitakama began to act in a manner that
suggests he may well have become a stooge of the
Hittites. Rulers of other Egyptian vassal cities

reported attempts by the ruler of (Qadesh to subvert
them to the Hittite cause, and attacks by (Qadesh on
Egyptian vassals in Upe suggest that he was func-
tioning as a Trojan Horse against the Egyptians on
behalf of Hatti.

Unwilling as ever to intervene, Egypt turned to
Aziru, the ruler of Amurru, and charged him to
protect Egyptian interests in the region. Hut, as in
the days of his father, Aziru exploited the Egyptian
commission and gold for his own ends and once
again began to expand Amurru\s boundaries at the
expense of neighbouring vassal states. Word also
reached Egypt of disturbing rumours that Aziru
was playing a double game by flirting with the Hit-
tites and had even entertained envoys of the Anato-
lian power. With Qadesh almost certainly tacitly in
the Hittite camp and Amurru in contact with the
Hittites, the time had now come for Egypt to act.
Aziru was ordered to present himself at the court of
Pharaoh to explain his behaviour while that of
Qadesh was interpreted as a vassal in revolt. A mili-
tary solution was necessary. Although very sparsely
documented, an Egyptian assault on Qidesh in the
reign of Akhenaten is now assumed to have occurred
and Failed. Qulesh now passed into the domain of
the Hittite monarch, its recovery becoming the
focus of Egyptian military efforts down until the
time of Rameses II. Aziru reluctantly journeyed to
the court of Akhenaten where his enforced stay last-
ed several years. It was the continued reluctance of
the Egyptians to base strong military forces in Syria
and their perseverance in maintaining the policy of
ruling through proxies that determined them to
release Aziru and return him to Amurru. The pre-
sumption was that he was at least trustworthy to the
extent that the interests of Amurru coincided with
those of Egypt.

In the meantime Suppiluliumas had undertaken
a major reorganization of the Hittite position in
northern Syria. Carchemish had finally fallen and
the Ilittite king proceeded to place that city and
Aleppo under the direct rule of his sons. With their
own military establishments they would be available
to encourage the loyalty of the vassals and counter
any potential trouble. The proximity of such large
nominally i littite’ forces in Syria but the absence of
anv Egyptian equivalent in her own Syrian territo-
ries dramatically changed the perceived balance of

13

INTRODUCTION

M During the period from
1352 to 1318 three gener-
als wore the double crown
o f Upper and Lower
Egypt. The most impor-
tant of these and the last
king of the 18th Dynasty
was Horemheh . He was a
stern ruler who set about
the internal reorganiza-
tion of the kingdom and
strengthened the lines of
communications with
Asia.

power in the region. For Aziru the presence of a
powerful Hittite power base in northern Syria
determined where his loyalties would now lie. Hav-
ing returned to Amurru he revoked his vassal oath
to Egypt and fell at the feet of the Sun, the Great
king of I Iatti' and thus became a \assal of Suppiluli-
umas.

With the defection of Amurru and Qadesh

Egypt had lost two vital strategic possessions in
central Syria and the border with Hatti had now
been thrust south of the Eleutheros valley. That the
Hittites came to view these new borders as perma-
nent was a perception never shared by Egypt and
indeed the recovery of the lost lands of Amurru,
Qadesh and beyond was to become the avowed
ambition of the early pharaohs of the 19th Dynasty.

14

THE CAMPAIGNS OF SETI I

The Campaigns of Seti I

With the demise of Tutankhamun in 1352 the army
seized the reins of power in Egypt and over the next
thirty-two years the throne of the two lands was
occupied by three generals. Any desire to recover
Amurru and Qadesh were set aside in the face of the
need to reorganize Egypt after the troubles of the
reign of Akhenaten. This notwithstanding, it is clear
that in the wake of the loss of these possessions
Egyptian policy towards its ‘empire 1 underwent a
major shift. The use of proxies as a substitute for
military power had clearly been found wanting. Its
replacement by a new policy described bv Egyptolo-
gists as ‘military occupation 1 finds testimony in the
archaeological record in the late Amarna period and
early 19th Dynasty. The inference to be drawn is
that the army now became the guiding hand in the
formulation of policy in Asia. As early as the reign
of Horemhcb (1348-20) it is possible to discern the
will to recover Egypt’s ‘lost territories’ by military
means. It was he who began the resettlement of the
old Hvksos capital at Avaris in the eastern delta. Its
nearness to the routes to Canaan and Syria made it
an excellent site as a forward operating base for the
rapid transit of Egyptian forces to Asia; indeed it
was to become such under Seti and his son.

It was with the accession of Seti I to the throne of
Egypt that intention became translated into reality.
There was no ambiguity to the new Pharaoh’s ambi-
tion and it was writ large in his selection of his
Horus name. In a conscious allusion to the
praenomen of Amosis I, founder of the 18th
Dynasty and Egypt’s empire in Asia, he called him-
self ‘Repeater of Birth’, that is, inaugurator of a new
beginning of Egypt’s greatness. In the first year of
his reign Seti took his army into Palestine to destroy
a coalition of hostile Canaanite princes and thence
northwards along the coast into the Lebanon. The
importance of this campaign lay not so much in
what it achieved as in how it was at once a pointer to
the future and a conscious allusion to the past. For
the first time, possibly, since the reign of Tuthmosis
IV Pharaoh was personally leading the army into
Egypt’s Asiatic possessions. This served notice that
a break had been made w ith the policy of the Amar-
na period when the military had been employed in
penny packets in essentially police actions. Now

A The mummified fea-
tures of Seti 1 (1318-04)
still manage to convey the
determination and resolve
that lay behind his vigor-
ous and successful cam-
paigns to recover Qadesh
from the llirtites. Never-

theless , the very fact that
his son Rameses 11 set out
to retake the city means
that the Hittites had pos-
sibly successfully
reclaimed it even before
Seti f s death.

Egyptian interests would be served by the full army
and led by Pharaoh in person. For Seti, as indeed
for his son, the model for their policy in Asia was
Tuthmosis III, and in a conscious emulation of his
strategy Seti led his armies sometime after Year 2
northwards to begin his offensive against the Hittite
empire.

Seti’s Syrian campaigns are recorded on the west
w ing of his war monument at Karnak. Attending the
visual register is the statement, ‘... The ascent that
Pharaoh ... made in order to destroy the land of
Qadesh and the land of Amurru’. A fragment of a

15

INTRODUCTION

victory stela recovered from Qadesh and bearing
Seti’s name is testimony to his seizure of the city as
it passed under Egypt’s aegis for the last time.
Amurru, however, is thought at this stage to have
remained true to its Haiti allegiance* Possession of
Qadesh, however, allowed Pharaoh to realize the
Hittites’ greatest fear. Emulating Tuthmosis III, he
took his armies into northern Syria by way of
Qadesh and there met and defeated a Hittite force.
That the Hittite response to this was not more over-
whelming given the high stakes involved has led
some scholars to argue that the bulk of the main
Hittite army, and not the Syrian vassal levies Seti
actually defeated, were heavily involved elsewhere.
And indeed, l he problem posed by Assyria on
Haiti’s eastern borders may well have meant that in
the short term the Egyptian success in Syria would
have to be tolerated.

None the less it would seem that before Seti’s
death in 1304 Qadesh had already returned to the
Hittite fold because in the annals of Mursilis there
is a suggestion of the conclusion of a treaty with
Egypt which presumably returned affairs in Syria to
the status quo ante.

So matters rested. It was not until the fourth year
of the reign of Seti’s son Rameses II that the peace

in Syria was once more shattered when seemingly
out of the blue Amurru, playing its game of old,
defected to Egypt. In that same year Pharaoh led his
armies northward in a fast dash to receive, in all
probability, the formal oath of submission from
Benteshina, King of Amurru. The new Hittite
monarch Muwatallish was not oblivious to the aspi-
rations of his Egyptian counterpart. Rameses was
known to harbour great ambitions in northern
Syria, but to realize these Egypt would first need to
secure Qadesh. In this matter JIatti had to act.
Should Qadesh also fall the Hittite position in
northern Syria, and in particular the strategic satel-
lite states of Aleppo and Carchemish, would be
under threat from Egypt. Unlike the situation in the
days of his father, there was no immediate Assyrian
threat to distract the Hittite monarch.

So it was that in the winter of 1301 Muwatallish
set about organizing an army that would, he intend-
ed, recover Amurru, secure Qadesh and shatter
totally Egypt’s military pretensions in the region.
The venue for the coming contest was not in doubt
in either camp. Beneath the walls of Qadesh Rame-
ses and Muwatallish would fight in one of the great
battles of history to settle by trial of arms the future
of their respective empires in Syria.

16

THE CAMPAIGNS OF SETf I

M A graphic based on the
battle reliefs of Sett I at
Kamak which shows the
Egyptian army fighting
on the plain before
Qa desk . Of pa rt icu l a r
note is the shape of the
citadel in the top right of
the register and be lorn
that th e vege tat ion th a t
marks the line of the trib-
utary of the Grant es
known as Al-Mukadiyah
to the west of the city.

► It was in early June of
1304 that Ranteses II
ascended the throne of
Egypt as sole ruler of the
Kingdom of the Two
Lands . 'This black granite
statue of the Pharaoh
shows him as he appeared
about the time of the bat-
tle oj Qades h when he
would have been in his
mid to late twenties. He is
shown wearing the * blue *
or 'war' crown known as
the K he pres h which was
worn in battle ,

17

INTRODUCTION

A Ru meses II was the
greatest of the pharaonic
builders of ancient Egypt.
Few of his monuments are
more impressive than the
great temple at Abu Si la-
bel. Visible expression of
the deification of the
Pharaoh in his lifetime ,
it is the foremost example
of the numerous buildings
that litter the two lands
bearing his name.

▼ ► The presumed
mummy of Raineses IF
discovered among a large
cache bearing the names
of some of the most illus-
trious rulers of Ancient
Egypt* by Emil
Rrugsclt-Rey in the Val-
ley of the Kings in 1881.
Recent medical analysis
in the 1 ( )67 mummy sur-
vey, however , suggests it
may be that of a man in
the middle to late fifties,
whereas Raineses II was
in his ( )()th year when In-
died.

18

II AND

fALLISH

In the light of the avowed intention of the early 19th
Dynasty Pharaohs to recover Egypt’s ‘lost’ lands in
Syria, the in dial success of Set i I in recovering
Qadesh and subsequently losing it again by treaty
must have been irksome to the young Raineses, As
crown prince he had been schooled from an early
age in the ways of the camp and had participated in
his father’s Libyan and Syrian campaigns. So when
his father died unexpectedly in the summer of 1304
he ascended the throne of the two lands imbued
with the desire to gain the glory of iheir recovery for
himself.

He was in his mid twenties when the twin crown
of Egypt was placed upon his head and his official
title announced as: ‘Raineses II, Falcon King, He of
the Two Goddesses* 1 lorus of Gold, King of Upper
and Lower Egypt, Use -mare. Son of Rc\ As master
of one of the world’s great empires, confident and
certain of his destiny, it w r as only a matter of time
before the new Pharaoh would set out on the road to
Asia to settle once and for all the ownership of
Syria .

It is apparent that the pharaonic ambition did not
perceive as any hindrance the legal nicety of the
treaty concluded with Ilatti by his father For
Rameses the vista of possibilities did not end with
Qadesh and Amurru but extended beyond to emu-
lating the achievements of the great warrior
Pharaohs of the previous dynasty. Although some
three years were to elapse before Amurru’s defec-
tion precipitated the war with Hatti, it is clear that
Rameses had been making preparations for its
inevitable outbreak for some time. Apart from
changes to and careful cultivation of the army, the
rebuilding of the old Hyksos capital Avaris, now
renamed Pi -Rameses and transformed into a major
base for military operations in Asia, served as a
major indicator of pharaonic intentions.

Of his counterpart on the Hittite throne we know
much less. Muwatallish was the second of the four

RAMESES II AND MUWATALLISH

children of Mursilis II, the opponent of Seti in his
Syrian wars. The death of his elder brother brought
Muvvatallish to the throne of Hatti some four years
before Rameses was crowned king in Egypt. He was
undoubtedly a strong and able ruler and a man of no
mean intelligence. His reorganization of Haiti's
western empire released the forces that allowed him
to field against Rameses at Qadesh the largest army
ever raised by the Hittite empire. That he was abso-
lutely determined to trounce once and for all Egyp-

tian pretensions to resurrect their northern Syrian
territories cannot be doubted, and is nowhere better
seen than in the petitional prayer that Muwatallish
offered to his gods:

‘On which campaign My Majesty shall march,
then if you O Gods, support me and I conquer the
land of Amurru — whether I overcome it bv force
of arms, or whether it makes peace with me — and I
seize the king of Amurru, then ... I will richly
reward you, O Gods...!'

M On the first and second
pylons of the mortuary
temple oj Rameses //,
nowadays known as The
Rameseum , are reliefs
depicting the Battle of
Qadesh. The building
itself was on a colossal
scale. The building was
wrongly described by
Diodorus as ‘ the tomb of
Osymandyas\ This error
arose from a misuse of
Use-mare , part of the
praenomen of the
Pharaoh. It was , howev-
er , this name and an
image of the fallen colos-
sus of Rameses at the
Rameseum that vaguely
inspired Shelley to pen
his famous sonnet *Ozy-
mandias \

20

THE OPPOSING ARMIES

The Might of Haiti

The army raised by the King of Haiti to challenge
the resurgent Egyptian empire and its new Pharaoh
at Qadesh was drawn from all corners of the Hittite
empire. The successful campaigns fought by
Muwatallish against the restive and troublesome
kingdoms of western and northern Anatolia and
their consequent re-organization allowed him to
draw on a very large body of troops for his Svrian
war against Egypt. At the heart of this army, com-
posed of allied and vassal forces, was that of (treat
Hatti itself.

In common with Late Bronze Age armies that of
Hatti was built around the chariot and infantry. The
former existed in the form of a small standing force
which was rapidly expanded in the campaigning sea-
son when men would be called to the colours in ful-
filment of the feudal obligations to the king. As in
Egypt the chariotrv tended to attract men from the
landed nobility and was an arm of high status.
Indeed, the expense of maintaining a chariot and
teams was also part of the feudal obligation of a
landed noble to his Lord. It is clear that the Hittites
quite happily employed mercenary troops and in the
Rameside Poem describing the Qadesh campaign
Pharaoh alludes to this when he says: \.. I Ie had no
silver left in his land, he stripped it of all its posses-
sions and gave them to all the foreign countries in
order to bring them with him to fight.' While mak
ing allowances for pharaonic hyperbole it is most
certain that a great deal of wealth was expended by
Muwatallish to raise his army to the numbers
deemed necessary to realize his campaign aims. It
was for this reason that many I Iittite soldiers for-
went pay, the prospect of booty being held as an
incentive to fight well. Clearly such a policy held
dangers. As we shall see, it was the lure of the booty
of the camp of Amun and Pharaoh’s enclosure that
drew the Hittite charioteers into premature combat.

In contradistinction to that of its great southern
enemy, the principal offensive arm of the Hittite
army was the chariot. 'The difference extended to its
tactical employment which, being predicated on dif-
ferent assumptions, was revealed most clearly in the
design and crewing of the chariot itself. Although
Hittite chariot crews did employ the composite bow
it never supplanted the predominant weapon, the
long, thrusting spear. The Hittites viewed the chari
ot as essentially an assault weapon designed to crash
into and break up groups of enemy infantry. W ith
its axle placed centrally and strong enough to carry
a three-man crew, it was somewhat slower and cer
tainly less manoeuvrable than its Egyptian counter
part. Each design had its respective advantages and
disadvantages. When employed in optimum condi-
tions the shock tactics of Hittite chariotrv would
open the way for their infantry to follow through
and finish off the enemy. It followed that the latter
arm played a secondary role to that of the chariotrv.

Unlike the Egyptian infantry, who operated in
country relatively uniform in terms of terrain and
temperature — as reflected in the relative sameness
of their dress, Hittite infantry fought in more
diverse physical conditions. As such their dress
tends to reflect the needs of the campaign. Certainly
those illustrated on the Qadesh reliefs cannot be
taken as indicative of the standard appearance. The
long white coverall worn by so many at Qadesh is
not reflected in the dress of the infantryman at the
Kings Gate at Hattusas. The weaponry of the Hit-
tite footsoldier was in many ways similar to his
Egyptian counterpart. The 4 thr’ warriors surround-
ing Muwatallish at Qadesh are armed with a long
thrusting spear and short stabbing daggers similar
to those carried by the chariotrv. Although iron
weaponry had begun to make its appearance in the
Hittite army by this time, the major hand weapons
were the bronze sickle sword and the bronze battle-
axe. W hile it is clear that Hittite soldiers did wear

21

THE OPPOSING ARMIES

The flittite Empire and its Allies at Qadesh, 13 (ft) BC

0ARAWANNA

KARKISA0

■%

■ft

%

f?]MASA

m.

MMawanda

Elukka people
ESEHA RIVER LAND

\a" a

GDwilusa

Emira

ARZAWA

Ehapalla

0PITASSA

f ^

^ Apasas

%ga

HP*

HAITI & ALLIES

KNOWN LEADERS

APPROXIMATE NUMBERS

1

Hatti

Mnwalallish; Hattushilish

500 chariots; 5,000 infantry

2

Hakpis

Hattushilish

500 chariots; 5,000 infantry

3

Pitassa

Mitannamuwash

500 chariots; 5,000 infantry

4

Seha River Lard

Masturish

100 chariots; 1 ,000 infantry

5

Wllusa, Mira & Hapaila

Piyama-lnarash (?)

500 chariots; 5,000 infantry

6

Lukka People

?

100 chariots; 2,000 infantry

7

Mas a. Karkisa & A ra wanna

?

200 chariots; 4,000 infantry

B

KtTviiwarlna

?

200 chariots: 2,000 infantry

9

Carchemish

Sahunjnuwosh

200 chariots; 2,000 infantry

10

Mitanni

Sattuara

200 chariots; 2,000 infantry

11

Ligarit

Niqmapa

200 chariots; 2,000 infantry

12

Aleppo

Taimi-Sarmma

200 chariots; 2,000 infantry

13

Nuhashshe

?

100 chariots; 1,000 infantry

14

Ktnza (Qadesh)

IMiqmaddu

200 chariots; 2,000 infantry

Total: 1 3 Allied and Vassal States

3,700 chariots; 40,000 infantry

Tarhuntassa •

Mediterranean

ALASIYA

n

THE MIGHT OF HATTI

Black Sea

PALA

TUMMANA

KASSIYA

Zalpa *

Nerik

./ i

Hatlena • . — .

Hanhana L?J

GASGA LANDS

' HAKPIS

CD HATTI

• HaTtusas

Gaziura *

Marassantiya*

■ • UPPER LAND

Kussara

AZZI-HAYASA

Samuha

• #'

# Kanesh

(Nesas)

Nenassa

• Purushanda

fc U3lama •

LOWER LAND

Lawazantiya

ISHIJWA

sjKIZZUWADNA

• Kummanni

Tegarama #

URSHU

Tigris

Adaniya*

raPI |||:'

*

0

Carchamish*

0 MITANNI

rPj

MUKISH

ptzl

Alalakh .ALEPPO

Sea

=3-

Cu

O-

03

Ugarit •

*5

2

Eu Ph

EUnuhashshe

raie s

N QADESH
• (KINZA)

1 J "

0

1

20 40

y ■

60

80 ioo Milas

y i

I

0

1

50

100

r

150 Km

23

THE OPPOSING ARMIES

A Our best source for the
( ip pea ra nee of Hitt ite
chariots are the Egyptian
reliefs of the battle of
Qadesh. It is clear front a
number of sources that
Hittite chariot design and
tactics were predicated on
different assumptions
from those of their great
southern enemy . The
effectiveness of their
chariot arm lay in its
value as an assault
weapon , where the sheer

weight of the vehicle en
masse and at the charge
was employed to crash
into and demolish lines of
enemy infantry. This is
also reflected in the fact
that the principal weapon
carried was the long stab-
bing spear that armed the
three crewmen , driver ,
spearman and shield-
bearer. In order to accom-
modate this heavier load
the axle of the Hittite
vehicle was mid cab

which frequently led to
vehicles overturning at
speed because they were
less stable than their
Egyptian counterpart.
Given the lesser manoeu-
vrability of the Hittite
machine , it was an \ easi-
er 9 target for Egyptian
archers , whether mounted
or on foot. It was neces-
sary therefore for the
speannan to be protected
by the shield-bearer par-
ticularly in the charge

when they were vulnera-
ble to the effective
archery of the Egyptians.
The destruction of large
numbers of Hittite chari-
ots by their Egyptian
counterparts suggests that
with momentum and sur-
prise lost Hittite chariots
were very vulnerable to
the type of tactics
employed by Rameses
and his chariotry on the
day.

▼ A section from the
Ranteseum reliefs show-
ing Hittite chariots at
Qadesh. These have actu-
ally been recut; originally
they illustrated Egyptian
chariots with the wheels
to the rear of the cab. The
traditional three-man
crew has been added with
the distinctive Hittite
shield held prominently
forward by the hearer to
protect the other men as
the vehicles charge..

THE MIGHT OF HATTI

helmets and bronze scale armour, mam of those in
the Qadesh reliefs are shown without either. It has
been suggested that the ‘white 1 coverall, employed
when on campaign in Syria, may have been worn
over the scale armour used by many troops.

There can be no doubting that the Hittites were
masters of strategy and were prepared and able to
use guile and sleight of hand if it would yield advan-

tage. Evidence suggests that where possible the Hit-
tites would so engineer a situation as to catch their
opponents in open battle where the chariotry could
be used to greatest advantage, and in such a way as
to allow the infantry to follow through and dcli\er
the coup de grace. Indeed, this view of their opera-
tions on the battlefield is held by the author to just i-
fy the ease that what transpired at Qadesh was not

^ There are very few
sources illustrating the
appearance of Hittite
warriors. The most
famous is from the left-
hand inner side of the
King's Gate at Bogazkoy ,
the modern name for the
site of the ancient Hittite
capital Hattusas. He is
armed with a curved
pointed sword and a four-
pronged and socketed hat -
t/eaxe. His helmet is
probably of bronze with
flaps to cover the neck
and cheeks and is deco-
rated with a long plume
which hangs down his
back.

^ These fragments of
scale armour recovered
from the Hittite capital
Hattusas are , like their
Egyptian counterparts , of
bronze. Fragments of iron
scales have been found,
but it is extremely unlike-
ly that at the time of the
battle any iron scale
armour would have been
employed. Clearly shown
are the holes through
which the scales would
have been fixed to the
skirt. In the reliefs many
of the crew of Hittite
chariots are illustrated
wearing such armour.

25

THE OPPOSING ARMIES

of Hatti were every bit as brave and formidable as
any that the Nilotic empire could field.

It is contended in a number of places in this text
that Haiti and Egypt had agreed to Qadesh as die
venue for the battle to resolve their respective
claims to Syria. In part this assertion arises from ihe
important role Law played in the Hi trite dealings
with all aspects of its empire. With, the defection of
Amurru in the winter of 1302/01, the view from

26

the battle the Hitt ties had intended to fight, but that
they were in fact awaiting the arrival and concentra-
tion of the entire Egyptian army on Qadesh before
deploying and forcing the battle on the plain.

The Hit rites were a truly formidable military foe
and while Rameses could eon descending! v and
pejoratively speak of them as 'effeminate ones' bv
virtue of their predilection for wearing their hair
long, he was to learn very quickly that the warriors

PHARAOH. ARMY AND STATE

M Hittite chariot and
crew. It is clear that ,
n o t wi th s ta n d ing Ra m e-
ses ' disparaging reference
to the Hittites as 'effemi-
nate ones * by virtue of
their tendency to he
clean-shaven and wear
their hair long, they were
form id a b l e so / d iers . 7 'heir
most powerful arm was
the char to try, and the
example shown here typi-
fies the features of the
I Unite vehicle. The three-
man crew comprised the
un armoured driver, and
a rm o tired spea rm a n a ml
the shield carrier, who
provided protection for
i he spea rman. Th e des ign
and armament of the Hit *
the chariot was optimised
for its primary purpose of
cl ose- o rder co m ha t >

Hatti was that the treaty ratified by Seri and Mur-
silis guaranteeing the borders of the two empires in
Syria had been broken. It is known that the Hittite
kings took great care to justify a declaration of war
Certainly the defection of Amurru constituted in
the strict legal sense a casus belli. Although no men-
tion is derivable from Hittite or Egyptian records, it
seems very likely that Muwatallish took the neces-
sary legal steps prior to his declaration of war. I lav-

ing charged Raineses with inspiring the defection of
his vassal, Amurru, the Hittite king would have told
Raineses that the matter between them was now to
be settled by the judgement of the gods and in the
theatre of wan Sometime during the early winter of
1301 it is very likely that a Hittite messenger arrived
at the court of Pharaoh at Pi-Rameses with a formal
message from Muwataliisln In its essence and senti-
ment its wording would have differed not at all from
that sent to the King of Arzawa some years before
by his lather Mursilis:

"My subjects who went over to you, when I
demanded them back from you, you did not restore
then to me: and you called me a child and made
light of me. Up then! Let us fight, and let the
Storm-god, my lord, decide our easel 1

As the to venue lor their contest? It would be
(^adesh, for as we shall see, I here could be none
other!

Pharaoh, Army and State

it was on Day 9 of the second month of the summer
season (mid to late April 1300) that the Egyptian
army, having been mustered at the Delta city and
military outpost of Pi-Rameses, advanced beyond
the great frontier fortress of Tjel and on to the coast
road to Gaza, to begin the month-long trek to its
appointed battlefield beneath the walls of Qadcsh in
central Syria. For Raineses II, in the van of this
great host, imbued with the burning desire to
restore his empire’s northern borders and emulate
the martial exploits of his illustrious pharaonic fore-
bears, the prospect of victory over the I littites must
have seemed inevitable. Such optimistic expecta-
tions, shared by king and rank and file alike, were
surely not misplaced, for this army was one of the
largest and best equipped that had yet been assem-
bled for offensive operations by the Egyptian state.
With its mass chariot squadrons, infantry compa-
nies, glittering Standards and military musicians,
the Rameside army was the heir to and the ultimate
expression of an Egyptian military tradition already
some three centuries old.

Although Egypt had always maintained military
forces in the Old and Middle Kingdoms, the partic-
ular form that emerged in the New Kingdom and
the manner in which l he slate became organized to

27

THE OPPOSING ARMIES

serve its needs dates from the mid 16th century. In
the wake of the defeat of the Ilyksos by Amosis 1,
the first Pharaoh of the 18th Dynasty and New
Kingdom, Egypt’s policy towards those states and
peoples beyond her eastern frontiers fundamentally
changed. Inheriting the mantle of the Hyksos,
Egypt now found herself as tacit overlord of territo
ries stretching as Air north as the River Euphrates.
The emergence of a recognizably imperial policy
towards Canaan and the Levant coincided with the
realization that the projection of military power far
beyond Egypt’s eastern frontier was the most effec-
tive method for ensuring her defence. Such now

became the keystone of Egypt’s policy in dealing
with the Levant and goes far to explain her involve-
ment there over the next four centuries. The corol-
lary of such a policy was the existence of a profes-
sional standing army equipped with the full panoply
of weaponry consistent with Late Bronze Age chari-
ot warfare, and a state organized for supporting
such on a large scale. In the period of economic
reconstruction and political centralization that fol-
lowed the defeat of the Hyksos, the foundations of
the Egyptian military state, able to sustain a power-
ful standing army and a wide-ranging imperial poli-
cy in Canaan and beyond, were laid. In a very real

^ Each of the four corps
of the Egyptian army
deployed in the Qadesh
campaign was organized
around troops from a spe-
cific region or temple
estate in Egypt and named
for the local god. The pre-
mier corps was that of
Am un , the god of Thebes
(* A *). The second ( x l V)
was that of P' Re ( The
Re), the sun god of
Heliopolis. These two
corps were the original
units of the army to which
were added that of Sutekh
or Set (*C f ). Sutekh was
regarded as the Lord of
Upper Egypt and was par-
ticularly venerated by the
pharaohs of the 19 th
Dynasty. Seti I was
named for Sutekh. The
corps of Sutekh was based
on Avaris , later Pi- Ram e-
ses in the eastern delta.
Ptah ('D') was raised by
Rameses II and was
named for the local god of
Memphis. It must be said ,
however , that Ptah may
have been raised before
the corps of Sutekh
although Seti I does not
mention the corps of Ptah
in his campaign of Year /
in Canaan when only
Amun , P'Re and Sutekh
(Set) are spoken of.

28

PHARAOH. ARMY AND STATE

sense it was this translation of Egypt into a military
state, with all Lhal presaged on the international
scene in the Ancient Near East, that is the dominat-
ing, if not defining, feature of what is called the
"New Kingdom’ period of her history.

The emergence of the professional military as a
distinct caste during the New Kingdom had a major
impact on the internal politics of the Egyptian state.
Not the least of factors contributing to the growth
of influence of the military was the relationship of
many of the 18th and 19th Dynasty pharaohs with
their army. Schooled from an early age in discipline
and the arts of war, the heir to the throne was
entrusted to officers charged with imparting the
knowledge, skills and understanding required by a
martial ruler. Such conditioning was subsequently
apparent in the manner that as pharaoh, Egypt and
the empire were governed. The archetype of the
military king was Tuthmosis III (1504-1450) who by
his military exploits raised the status of Egypt to
that of the greatest power in the ancient Near East
(and whose example was to spur the military ambi-
tions of Raineses II) and honed the Egyptian army
into the most formidable instrument of war the
world had yet seen.

The influence and power of the military in the
gt ) ver n m en l o f E gy pt grew during the 18th D y n as ty
and had become openly manifest by the early 10th
Dynasty. Whether serving as staff officers with
direct access to the court or in ‘retirement 1 and
rewarded by appointment as personal attendants,
stewards of the royal estates or tutors to the
pharaoh’s children, the military came to play a for-
mative role in the life of the state. So great had this
influence become that during the reign of
bov-Pharaoh Tutankhamun {c. 1352) it was the mili-
tary who controlled the reins of government. With
the death of Ay the throne passed into the hands of
the army strongman Horemheb who vigorously set
about the internal reorganization of the kingdom
following the depredations of the reign of Akhenat-
cn. This was but the prelude to what was intended
to be the revival of Egypt's Asian empire and recov-
ery of the lands lost to the Hittites under Suppiluli-
umas. With his death, the torch was passed on to his
successor and the founder of the 19th Dynasty,
Raineses I, Seti I and in turn to Rameses II. The
new 19th Dynasty had its roots in the military and

under rheir aegis the army was highly influential.

The sociological impact of the army on Egyptian
life in the New Kingdom was significant and can be
gauged by the manner in which it came to be seen as
a means of social and material advancement for rich
and poor alike. For the latter, service with the army
opened up the prospect of the acquisition of wealth
and status unimaginable to the peasant who stayed
on the land. To one who demonstrated bravery and
intelligence not only was there the prospect of
reward of the "Gold of Valour' and a share in the
rich booty taken on campaign, but also the possibili-
ty of promotion to officer rank. Other benefits

A superb example of
the sickle sword that
equipped most of the
arm i vs of t h e An den t
Near East in the Bronze
Age. Known in Egypt as the
k hopes h sword, it took its
name from the similarity of
the curved blade to the foreleg
of an an int a L 7 he agricu ft a t a l
antecedents of the weapon are
i lea rly a pp a ten t , / is cut t i ng edge
lay on the curved outer section and
the sword was used as a smiting
weapon .

29

THE OPPOSING ARMIES

accruing from successful service illustrate the con-
cern taken by the pharaohs to care and nurture the
soldiery as a professional caste. A late Rameside
papyrus details the granting of land for farms bv
pharaoh to officers, charioteers, mercenaries as well
as simple rankers. In addition pharaoh would pro-
vide the beneficiary with cattle and servants from
the royal household for employment on these farms.
Although the beneficiary paid taxes on their
employment, the recipient was able to retain them
as long as one of the male members of his family, in
direct line of succession, was available to serve in
the army or navy. It was this policy more than any
other that helps explain the increasingly hereditary
nature of the military in the late 18th and 19th
Dynasties. An earlier taxation papyrus dating from
the third year of Seti I’s reign (c. 1315) lists the
householders of a district in the city of Memphis
and serves to demonstrate the standing of the mili-
tary in Egyptian society. Alongside those of civilian
occupations are listed an army scribe, marines,
marine standard-bearers, charioteers, battalion com-
manders, a captain and a lieutenant-general.

The high status and wealth of the army and the
manner in which it was seemingly ‘indulged’ by the
pharaohs brought forth the ire of other professions
who saw able recruits ‘seduced’ away from the more
traditional routes to social advancement. This is
nowhere better illustrated than in the diatribes
against the lures of the military life offered by
scribes in 20th-Dynasty sources. The self-serving
invective of the scribes failed completely to perceive
that the relationship of pharaoh to his army was not
one of indulgence but pragmatic self-interest. The
pharaohs of the 18th and 19th Dynasties assumed
that reciprocity in the care for their soldiery would
be shown by the military on the field of battle. Obli-
gation demanded that each soldier strive to ‘win a
good name’ and by bravery and hard fighting deliver
to pharaoh the victories in war that were his due.
Such observations offer important insights for our
understanding of the event s at Qadcsh.

Indeed, it is the perceived failure of the troops of
Amun and P’Re at (Qadcsh to hold their ground and
face the Hittite chariotrv that results in Rameses
bitterly denouncing them for desertion and cow-
ardice. The vehemence with which he pours scorn
on the survivors of the two divisions after the battle

makes clear his conviction that the troops had bro-
ken the compact with their Lord and in abandoning
the field of battle had committed the capital offence
of treason consequentially translating their status
from that of subject to rebel. The author of the
‘Poem’ has Rameses speaking thus:

‘How cowardly are your hearts, my chariotry,
nor is there any worthy of trust among you any
longer. Is there not one among you to whom I did a
good deed in my land? Did not I arise as Lord when
you were poor, and I caused you to be high officers
by my Beneficence every day, placing the son over
the possessions of his father, and making to cease all
evil that was in this land? And I released unto you
your servants and gave you others who had been
taken from you. Whoever asked petitions “I will do
it” said 1 to him, every day. Never had a Lord done
for them for his army, those things which my
Majesty did for your sakes. The crime which my
infantry and my chariotry have done is greater than
can be told.’

As we shall see in our consideration of the after-
math of the battle, what has been interpreted by
some commentators as a continuation of the battle
into a second day, may be more credibly explained
as pharaoh visiting summary judgement on num
bers of his own ‘cowardly’ soldiers whom he
adjudged to be ‘rebellious’ subjects.

The Rameside Army

It was in all probability during the short reign of his
father Rameses I, that crown prince Seti began the
task of enlarging the Egyptian army. The imperative
to do so arose from the new dynasty’s self-appoint-
ed task of recovering Egypt’s lost lands in central
Syria. Such an ambition, by its very nature, could
only be realized by force of arms — and in the king-
dom of Hatti the new dynasty faced a formidable
foe.

Although we possess very little information about
the gathering of military intelligence in ancient
Egypt it seems reasonable to assume that the state,
as did other powers of the time, made some effort to
discern the military potential of rival kingdoms. In
the light of this assumption, the expansion of the
Egyptian army is understandable, for the Hittite
kingdom had displayed its ability to field large and

30

THE RAM ESI DE ARMY

highly effective armies on many occasions. Certainly
the military activities of the Hittites during the pre-
ceding century had done much to broadcast the
formidable nature of their power. In consequence
Seti was under no illusion as to the magnitude of the

military task that faced him. To reinvigorate Egypt's
empire and successfully wrest the territories of cen-
tral Syria from Hatti would require a major effort in
equipping and fielding an army far larger than any
raised by Egypt before.

► Egyptian heavy
infantryman. Throughout
the New Kingdom, the
Egyptian army was built
around a care of hng-ser-
vice veteran heavy
infantry, as shown here ,
While this grizzled and
ba 1 1 le-h a rden ed *m e nfyt '
carries the same weaponry
of bronze khopesh sword
and spear that typified
most New Kingdom
i n fa n try r his up pea ra n ce
is that of a / 9th Dynasty
trooper and thus repre-
sents the heavy infantry
found in four corps of
Amun f P'Re * Sutekh
(Set) and Ft ah at the
Battle of Qadesh. Distinc-
t ive 1 9th Dj * na s ij r fea i u res
include the strengthened
headdress, the stiffened
linen-padded body
armour and large oval-
shaped groin guard.

(Angus M cBri de )

1 \

THE OPPOSING ARMIES

?jV\ 1

j /

■ u .

M fit

1 ™ M

The Field Army

The expansion was most obviously discernible in
the addition of two additional army corps to the
field army. It had ever been the tradition for Egyp-
tian soldiers to march and fight in local contingents.
In the New Kingdom these were organized as self-
contained corps which, when fully assembled for
campaign, numbered approximately 5,000 men.
Although a broken passage in the annals of Tuth-
mosis III suggests that his army may have been
organized into four corps during the Battle of
Mcgiddo, only two are actually mentioned at a later
date in an edict of Horemheb. A third, Sutekh (Set),
was raised either in the reign of Raineses I or by
Seti, with the fourth very early in the reign of his
son, Rameses II. Each corps was based upon a tem-
ple or estate region in Egypt and named in honour
of the local god. That of Amun was from Thebes
with P’Rc from Heliopolis and Sutekh raised from
men of the north-east delta and was based upon the
old Hyksos capital at Avaris. The fourth, named for
the god Ptah, was drawn from the Memphite
region. It was these four corps that composed the
bulk of the Egyptian forces deployed for the Qadesh
campaign.

It is interesting to note how a number of commen-
tators have perceived Rameses’ decision to advance
his army on Qadesh in four corps as an aberration
on his part. Such a view serves to allow them
32

A Although dating from
the 15th century this The-
ban tomb painting shows
the technique of manufac-
turing shields which had
changed little if at all
some two centuries later.
Having scraped the hide ,
it is then shaped to Jit the
wooden frame. Finished

shields can be seen to the
rear of the figure in the
upper centre of the pic-
ture. The hides of cows
were used for ordinary
ranks , whereas the shields
of royal persons were
made Jr om the hides of
more exotic animats.

severely to criticize him and argue that it was this
‘decision’ to ‘divide’ his army that opened the way
for the Hittites to attack his strung-out forces,
bringing them to the verge of catastrophic defeat.
The criticism is not valid for it is quite clear that the
advance of the army on Qadesh in four corps was
not an idiosyncratic whim on the part of Rameses
but totally consistent with standard Egyptian mili-
tary practice. There were indeed sound strategic
and logistical reasons for why this was the case.

The deliberately self-contained nature of each
corps, comprising approximately 5,000 men of
whom some 4,000 were infantry with the other
1,000 crewing the 500 attached chariots, provided
the Pharaoh with a remarkable degree of flexibility
on campaign. Locally dispersed operations in w hich
each corps could be allocated separate objectives
were balanced by the manner in which each operat-
ed within supporting distance, although it is clear
that they could operate independently at some dis-

THE FIELD ARMY

tance from one another when needs demanded. One
of the best examples of this practice, aparl from that
of Qadesh itself, dates from the first campaign of
Seti in northern Palestine in about 1318. In order to
destroy a coalition of Asiatic princes, ‘... his majesty
sent the first army of Amun, named “Mighty of
Bows”, to the town of Hamath, the first army of
P’Re, named “Plentiful of Valour”, to the town of
Beth Shan, and the first army of Set, named
“Strong of Bows” to the town of Yenoam.’ A well-
balanced fighting force of infantry, archers and
chariots was more than adequate to deal on a piece-
meal basis with a nascent coalition of Palestinian
princes. Indeed this description of an armed excur-
sion is more characteristic of the bulk of Egyptian
military operations in the New Kingdom period
than ever was the full-scale battle such as Megiddo
or Qadesh. While on the one hand the corps struc-
ture of the Egyptian army conveyed great tactical
flexibility, it was also a sound and rational response
to the difficulties of supplying and feeding large-
numbers of soldiers during this period. Considera-
tion of this issue will also provide insight into mat-
ters of some import for understanding how events
unfolded at Qadesh.

Although the Egyptian army possessed a well-
organized commissariat, the feeding of a large expe-
ditionary force on the move through Canaan and
northwards to Syria was heavily dependent on the
provision of supplies provided by vassal rulers along
the line of march. Inasmuch as military campaign-
ing was confined to the time of the year known as
the season in which ‘the kings went forth to war’,
the long-term stocking up by vassals of provisions to
feed the army would have required considerable
notice. Reference to such advance warning is to be
found in the El-Amarna letters where, for example,
Arzawiya of Rukhizzi states ‘... The king my lord
has written concerning preparations for the arrival
of troops of the king my lord, and for the arrival of
his many commissioners.’

Once away from the territories under firm Egyp-
tian control the army would need to fall back upon
stored provisions carried in wagons drawn by oxen.
Those benefiting from these supplies would be the
officers and senior ranks. No doubt other vehicles
carried fodder for the vital chariot teams. Notwith-
standing the undoubted efficiency of the scribes

who oversaw the provision of supplies and rations,
Bronze Age logistics were simply not up to the task
of catering for the needs of all the troops in a corps
on the march. For a force of 5,000 men the supply
train would not only have been very large but also
slow — oxen are not renow ned for rapidity of move
mentl The more lowly soldiery were forced, as
would many other armies throughout history, to live
off the land. Indeed the exactitude with which
scribes and quartermasters were trained to calculate
supply needs and the reality of never having enough
to feed all the soldiers in a corps is well addressed in
a number of extant papyri.

By moving the army by corps and staggering their
advance, a bivouacked force could support itself
while not stripping the land for those following
behind. In practice, positing a rate of advance of
between 13 and 15 miles a day (this figure is not
pulled oul of the air, but is an average of those fig-
ures given for the advance of the Egyptian Army
throughout the New r Kingdom when moving from
Egypt to Canaan and Syria, when such are men-
tioned) the distance between each army corps on a
line of march towards a designated assembly point,
in this case the Plain of (Qadesh, would need to be
about half that distance or less. Conveniently such a
figure reveals itself in the text of the ‘Poem’ when
the distance between Rameses, Amun and the corps
of P’Re, crossing the ford ‘south of the town of
Shabtuna’, is given as A 1 iter’ . The specificity with
w hich this unit of distance is employed by the origi-
nator of the ‘Poem’ points very strongly to its being
a standard measure drawn from a military manual or
similar document. Highly variable figures have been
proffered by commentators for this term, ranging
from 1 '/ 2 miles to 1272-1572 miles. Such variability
is excessive. As the distance separating the corps of
Amun and P’Re at the onset of the battle is itself of
great significance in establishing a credible time-
frame for the events that transpired, it is very
important that we determine this distance with
some degree of exactitude. In placing the camp of
Rameses to the north-west of Qadesh, the distance
to the ford would be about 772 miles with the
notional value of s \ iter’ corresponding to approxi-
mately 672 miles. Using this figure as a yardstick it
could be shown how the second of two corps on a
line of march, presuming a rate of advance suggest-

33

THE OPPOSING ARMIES

ed above, would always encamp in an area that had
not been ‘stripped bare' by foraging troops of the
first corps. But the third and fourth corps, if
advancing along the same axis, would never find
very much in the way of sustenance.

Such eminently practical considerations have
caused a number of commentators credibly to
observe that the corps of Ptah and Sutekh may have
followed a parallel line of march to Amun and P'Re
along the west bank of the Orontes rather than fol-
low directly in the footsteps of the two leading divi-
sions as they advanced on the eastern side, as is nor-

mally assumed. Such may also be supported by a
reference in the ‘Poem’ to Ptah ‘being to the south
of the town of Aronama’ which is on the western
bank of the river. Indeed it is because Ptah possibly
had no need to ford the river at Shabtuna, as had
Amun and P’Re, that it was able to advance relative-
ly quickly to support Rameses, once word of his
predicament had been received from the Pharaoh’s
Vizier, who had been dispatched specifically for that
purpose before the battle. Nevertheless, most com-
mentators have assumed that all four corps
advanced along the eastern bank of the Orontes.

M By the time of Qadesh
in 1300 the Egyptian army
was a highly professional
force of elevated social
standing within Egypt .
Notwithstanding the
introduction of the chariot
arm at the beginning of
the 18th Dynasty , it was
still essentially an
infantry army. The
Rameside infantry shown
here carry their shields
strapped across their backs
and in addition to their
spears cany either a
bronze-headed ba t tie axe
or the sickle sword known
as the ‘ khopesh \

34

THE COMBAT ARMS

► 19th Dynasty Nubian
a rch e r. N a h i a wa s va iu-
able to the New Kingdom
pharaohs* not only for its
supply of gold and other
products ami resources,
but also for its manpower.
Nubians sewed as merce-
nary infantry, putting to
good use their noted skills
with the bow. They
ret a i ned t h e i r dis ti n ct ive
costume and served in
their own units. Each of
the four corps at Qadesh
wo it / d h a ve d efi / oyed
Nu hi an a rch ers . A ngus
McBride)

The Combat Arms

Unlike the Hittites whom they were preparing to
flight, the power of the Egyptian soldiery was vested
in its infantry rather than chariot arm. It is in this
way that the New Kingdom Egyptian army demon-
strates a remarkable continuity with the military
forces of the Old and Middle Kingdoms. This is not

surprising because Egv pi always possessed a larger
native population than did her enemies ant! was
therefore able to use it lo provide the backbone of its
military power. Although with the arrival of the
chariot mobility was conferred and developed into a
highly effective striking arm, even at the height of
its military prestige the army was still built around
the infantry companies of the respective army corps.

35

THE OPPOSING ARMIES

A The basic inventory of weaponry
used by the Egyptian infantryman at
Qadesh. Hit ft the composite bom are the
bronze-headed ban lea ve, the kit opes h
sword and the bronze thrusting dagger.

The latter three weapons mere used by
the close-combat troops. The composite
bom mas very powerful and was the
principal offensive weapon of both the
i nf mt rj * and i h c ch a no try \

A One of the earliest
extant depictions of a
m ount ed h o rsem a n da t i ng
front the reign of
Ho re nth eh is to be seen in
the bottom left-hand cor-
ner of this picture . The
eni ploj r n ivt it of t he do n key
seat shows that much
expertise had still to he
gained in the riding of
horses. Of note also is the
relatively small size of the
animal which today
mould be likened more to
a large pony .

36

ORGANIZATION: THE INFANTRY

The use of large numbers of infantry also allowed
the Egyptians to exploit the national experience in
the mobilization and administration of large bodies
of men for the great pharaonic building projects.
Such expertise translated itself naturally to the army
which adopted many of the administrative proce-
dures employed for such purposes within Egypt.

Organization: The Infantry

The 4,000 infantry of an army corps were organized
into twenty companies or ‘sa’ of between 200 and
250 men each. Their esprit de corps was fostered by
the adoption of distinctive Standards many of whose
names (from the New Kingdom) have survived.

Most predate the Rameside period as in the cases of
‘Hull in Nubia’, ‘the Aten glitters’, ‘prowling lion’,
‘Menkeperc: the destroyer of Syria’, ‘Manifest in
Justice’ and ‘Splendour of Aten' from the reign of
Amenophis III. It is likely that from the time of
Raineses II company names would have been in the
same vein with specific allusions to pharaoh's royal
titles and the dynasty’s veneration of the god
Sutekh.

Within each company the soldiers were further
broken down into units of 50 men. In battle the
companies would be drawn up in a phalanx; experi-
enced soldiers (menfyt) serving in the front ranks,
recruits (nefru) and reserves to the rear. Foreign sol-
diers, of whom there were many in the Rameside

37

THE OPPOSING ARMIES

army, maintained their own identity, either serving
within the army corps or employed as additional
units alongside the regular native Egyptian troops.
Companies of Libyans, Nubians, Canaanite and
Sherdens served with the Egyptians and although
often described as ‘mercenaries’ were more likely
impressed prisoners who preferred the life of a sol-
dier in pharaoh’s army to the alternative of slavery.

It is the ‘nakhtu-aa’ who are most frequently illus-
trated on Egyptian reliefs. These were the infantry
known colloquially as the ‘strong arm boys’, special-
ists in close-quarters fighting and variously
equipped with weaponry, shield and rudimentary
body armour. The principal offensive weapon of the
Ramcsidc armies, however, was the composite bow.
Employed in large numbers by the infantry and

38

chariot arms, and fired singly or in volleys, it was a
deadly weapon in ihe hands of a trained archer.

The Chariotry

By the time of Qadesh the Egyptian chariot arm had
a tradition of mobile warfare dating back nearly
three hundred years. Large and magnificently

4 The war chariot of
Rameses II. This plate
illustrates very well the
appearance of Pharaoh as
he led the counter-attack
against the Hittite chari-
otry during its assault on
the encampment of
Amun. Drawn by his two
named horses , * Victory-
in - Thebes' and Mut-is-
contented\ and driven by
his personal driver ,
i Vienna , Rameses prepares
to fire his composite bow
into the milling enemy
chariotry. Shown to
advantage is the bronze
scale armour of the horses
and the long scale coat of
Phara oh. ( Angus
McBride)

THE CHARIOTRY

equipped, the distinctive design of the Egyptian
vehicle had reached the height of its development.
Unlike its heavier Hittite contemporary the Egyp-
tian chariot was designed above all for speed and
manoeuvrability, its lightweight even delicate
appearance disguising what was a very strong and
robust vehicle. Herein lay the key to its battlefield
deployment. Its offensive power lay not in its weight
but in its capacity rapidly to turn, wheel and repeat-
edly charge, penetrating the enemy line and func-
tioning as a mobile firing platform that afforded the
‘seneny* or fighting crewman the opportunity to
loose many arrows from his composite bow. The tac-
tic was to avoid, if possible, becoming embroiled at
close-quarters where the 1 littitc vehicles with their
three-man crews and long spears could dictate the
combat. It was without doubt the versatility of the
chariotry that saved the day for Rameses at Qadesh.

Unlike their Hittite brethren the chariotry did not
operate as a totally independent arm but were
attached to the infantry corps. By the time of
(Qadesh chariots were attached to a corps on the
basis of* 25 vehicles per company. Not all of these
were the heav ier combat types, many lighter vehicles
being retained for scouting and communications
duties. For combat, however, there was a hierarchy
of organization wherein the chariots were deployed
in troops of ten, squadrons of fifty and the larger
unit called a pedjet, commanded by an officer with
the title of ‘Commander of a chariotry host’ and
numbering about 250 chariots.

It is not possible to be precise about the size of the
Egyptian chariot force at (Qadesh though it could
not have numbered less than 2,000 vehicles spread
through the corps of Amun, P’Re, Ptah and Sutekh,
assuming that approximately 500 machines were
allocated to each corps. To this we may need to add
those of the Ne’arin, for if they were not native
Egyptian troops their number may not have been
formed from chariots detached from the army
corps. What is clear is that a considerable number of
the Egyptian chariot force was still on the road to
Qadesh when the battle took place and never saw
combat at all. Their arrival after the battle was over
provided Rameses with a fresh body of chariotry,
perhaps large enough to have dissuaded the Hittites
from further combat. Indeed, if neither Ptah nor
Sutekh were ever engaged, those available to

39

THE OPPOSING ARMIES

AT By the time of the
Battle of Qadesh the
Egyptian war chariot and
its crew had evolved into
a sophisticated and high-
ly refined war machine .

In its combination of
mobility and firepower it
could be said to be the

ultimate expression of
chariot warfare in the
Bronze Age . Originating
in the Cana unite designs
bequeathed by their Hyk-
sos mentors , they had by
the time of Qadesh
become distinctively
Egyptian \ Lightness of

design was always a char-
acteristic of the Egyptian
chariot and this has fre-
quently been equated
with structural weakness.
Such was far from the
case , and in a real sense
the features of the design
represent the optimum

compromise between
lightness and strength.

The photograph which
illustrates a lightweight
chariot from the reign of
Amenophis III shows the
features common to all
Egyptian chariot types.

In particular the axle at
the rear of the cab , and
the widely spaced wheels
facilitated the remark-
ably small and fast turn-
ing-circle so vital to
Egyptian tactics. The
heavier war chariot
shown below was struc-
turally stronger in order
to accommodate the range
of weapons carried , and
the scale armoured 4 'sene -
ny * or archer who
employed the composite
bow in battle. Certainly
was the highly effective
use of the Egyptian chart -
otry at Qadesh that saved
the day for Rameses.

40

THE CHARIOTRY

Pharaoh would have amounted to perhaps as mam-
as half of those raised for the campaign. The great
achievement of the Egyptians at Qadesh was to have
so blunted the offensive might of the Hittite ehari-
otry as to deprive Muwatallish of the very weapon
upon which the I Iittites depended for victory

► This wall painting,
from the tomb of Ke ria-
nt on at Thebes and dating
front the reign of
A m enopk is II, ill u$tra tes
the essential features of
the bronze scale armour
morn by many of the
figk t i tig crew m en at
Qadesh. Other designs,
including that morn by
Pharaoh in the battle and
shown elsewhere in this
text .suggest that smaller
scales mere used .

T While not historically
accurate in every respect*
the following stills front

the Cecil B. De Mi lie *j
1956 version 0/ The Ten
Commandments con-
veys in a highly effective
manner the appearance of
Ra tries i de cha ri o t ry \

Many of the essential fea-
tures of the chariots used
at Qadesh have been well
reproduced. The most
obvious anachronism is
the use of metal and plas-
tic rather than mood for
the six-spoked wheels.
Nevertheless, these re con-
st ru ctio n s convey
extremely well the appar-
ent lightness of design of
the Egyptian cabfBFf)

1 1 N 1 1 HU i n 1 » IT ^IT M M mil

5tyo to

fllftf Ail

1 \lf iaotKT

41

THE OPPOSING ARMIES

A A superb shot illustrat-
ing Egyptian mass chari-
ot ry. What is well con-
veyed is the density of
such vehicles on the move
and the impression given
of the length of line of
what is actually quite a
small number . Seen here
is a squadron of fifty
chariots. These would nor-
mally have been under the
command of an officer
known as the ‘ Standard-
Rearer of Chariot War-
riors'. In each of the
Egyptian army corps there
were 200-250 of these, or
four or five squadrons. IJ
one examines the photo-
graph of the Arab wagon
fording the Orontes ‘ south
ofShabtuna \ later in the
text , it becomes clear that
the passage of such num-
bers of chariots would
have taken no small
amount of time. How

42

i /

THE CHARIOTRY

much credibility therefore
can we ascribe to the
Rameside claim that in
the first wave of the Hit -
tite attach 2,500 chariots
forded the Orontes to
assault the corps ofP'Re
and attack the camp of
Am uti. The crossing of
such a huge number of
chariots would have taken
many hours. If the suppo-
sition is correct we are in
fact positing a far smaller
Hittite chariot force than
has hitherto been
assumed. ( BFI)

A In this shot from The
Ten Commandments
Rameses carries one of the
long heavy arrows which
are frequently seen trans-
fixing the bodies of dead
Hittites at Qadesh. Fired
from the very powerful
composite bow , they were
designed to penetrate the
bronze scale armour worn
by many Hittite chariot
crews . The upright lion
motif on the bow case
attached to the front right
side of the cab was partic-
ularly venerated by
Rameses II and was a
symbol of power and the
will to fight.

► The Sherden warriors
that formed part of the
elite guard of Rameses II
at Qadesh are well attest-
ed to in a number of the
reliefs depicting the bat-
tle. These foreigners had
been brought into the
army following their cap-
ture earlier in Pharaoh *s
reign when they had raid-
ed the Nile delta. Their
fighting abilities and par-
ticularly their weaponry ,
in the form of their long
swords . had made a great
impression on the Egyp-
tians. (Rob Chapman)

7 • '£ f t

id,, y' &jt

W'/Jok.

■ ■ e "- _ vsffap .•*

, tv i

% ►; ft

43

THE BATTLE OF QADESH

So it was that Rameses II, King of Upper and
Lower Egypt, awoke in his tent on the morning of
Day 9, in the third month (late May) of the summer
season in the fifth year of his reign. Encamped
among the troops of the senior corps of Amun, the
van of the Egyptian army lay approximately one
day’s march from Qadesh, in the "hill country to the
south’ of the city. The site of Pharaoh’s nocturnal
abode was identified earlier this century by the
American Egyptologist and archaeologist Henry
Breasted: a very high and conspicuous mound,
known as Kamuat cl-Harmel, towering some 600
feet above the east bank of the River Orontes. To the
rear of Pharaoh and separated from one another by
approximately half a day’s march lay the corps of
P’Rc, Ptah and Sutekh.

While this much is certain, what happens here-
after, based upon the less than specific and varying
accounts in the Rameside inscriptions, behoves the
reader to be conscious of the difficulties posed in
reconstructing events with the seeming exactitude
and certainty presumed elsewhere. Indeed, the
manner in which the accounts in the 'Poem’, ‘Bul-
letin’ and ‘reliefs' appear to dovetail rather than
agree, poses many problems and leaves many impor-
tant questions about the battle unresolved. Not least
of the observations is that the events which collec-
tively form the ‘battle’ require a longer time-frame
than is so often presumed in other accounts. In fact,
apart from the one reference in the Poem that fixes
Pharaoh’s camp to the south of Qadesh on Day 9,
there are no other attributions to specific dates. So
time, as a dimension within the inscriptions,
becomes telescoped and events when read in an
uncritical fashion flow in one continuous narrative.
This has frequently been reproduced in commen-
taries on the battle to give the impression that all
that transpired in the way of battle occurred on Day
9. It is the view argued herein that such could not
have been the case and that the main ‘battle’ took

place on Day 10, that is the day after Rameses and
the corps of Amun encamped on the Plain of
Qadesh. Only a time-frame such as the latter takes
account of the practical complexities attendant on
operations of Late Bronze Age armies, which any
credible narrative of the battle must do.

In accord with the plan of campaign agreed
between Rameses and his generals, he and Amun
struck camp shortly after daybreak on Day 9 with a
view to reaching the designated camp site on the
Plain of Qadesh before nightfall. There can be no
suggestion that the army was advancing into ‘terri-
tories new’. Qadesh and its environs was a ‘stamp-
ing ground' of old acquaintance for the Egyptian
army. Indeed, there must have been many soldiers
and officers in the various corps who could remem-
ber vividly the great battle they fought beneath the
walls of Qadesh with their young king's father. We
have every reason for believing that Rameses shared
this memory, having been present as crown prince.
Drawing on this earlier experience, the location of
the camp site was in all likelihood already deter-
mined. Despite the subsequent turn of events, we
must suppose therefore that Rameses and his gener
als presumed that within a few days the four corps
of the Egyptian army and the Ne’arin from the land
of Amor would be concentrated on the Plain of
Qadesh. This is a reasonable assumption because, as
we shall see, although the arrival of the Ne’arin on
Day 10 was indeed highly fortuitous given
Pharaoh’s desperate predicament, it was not at all
unexpected. I lad matters come to pass as Pharaoh
originally intended, the concentration of the Egyp
tian army on Qadesh would have been effected by
Day 1 1, but it would not have been ready to fight for
some days thereafter — men and horses on either
side needing time to recover from the strenuous
exertions of a month on the march.

It is very important to reiterate that neither
Rameses nor Muwatallish was in any doubt that

44

DECEPTION

Qadcsh was the venue for the battle. We have
already noted that the time and place was in all
probability determined in advance. Such was
required by the very limited logistical capabilities of
Bronze Age armies in the ancient Near East. There
could be no notion of strategic surprise being real-
ized through a wide-ranging war of manoeuvre.
What constituted the equivalence in this campaign
would be readiness for battle after arrival off the
march. While the two kings knew the venue for bat-
tle and approximately when it was likely to take
place, neither could know until contact was made by
their respective armies where exactly the other was.
More importantly, they were totally dependent on
the eyes and ears of their scouts to deliver into their
hands the vital piece of information that would give
them the decisive advantage over the other once
contact had been established. Was the enemy ready
for battle? For if one was ready and the other not, it
would be the former who would dictate the battle,
maximizing to the utmost the particular skills, tac-
tics and equipment of his own army. It is only when
we appreciate how absolutely vital such an advantage
would give the respective contenders can we begin
to understand what now transpired.

Deception

Throughout the morning Ramcses and the corps of
Amun descended from the hill country and having

► Fording the River
Orontes today in the
vicinity \ of the ford at
Shabtuna \ It was in this
area that Rameses and the
corps of Amun crossed
prior to advancing on
Qadesh on Day 9 , having
descended front the hills to
the south. Earlier com-
ments about the rather
careless manner in which
fording * is explained
away as if it were an
activity of no moment is
belied by this image. It
would probably have
taken Amun more than a
few hours to have crossed
the Orontes. (P. Parr)

emerged from the forest of Robawi began the slow
and ponderous crossing of the Orontes in the vicini
ty of Shabtuna. Interestingly one of the more recent
topographical surveys of the area has identified
Shabtuna with Tell Ma'ayan which lies some V/i
miles to the north of the ford that was in all proba
bility used by the Egyptians. Indeed nowhere in the
inscriptions is the ford stated to be at Shabtuna
itself, although this has been presumed and stated
repeatedly by other commentators. The largest set-
tlement close to the original crossing point is Ribla,
whose own claim to fame would come from its
employment as a base by Nebuchadnezzar II of
Babylon when directing from afar, the siege of
Jerusalem some seven centuries later.

As the advanced unit of the Egyptian army, Amun
had a far larger baggage train than either of the
other three corps. It is clear from the reliefs showing
the camp established by Rameses at Qadesh that
many of his personal household were in attendance.
Not only were a number of the royal princes with
their father but many servants and scribes of the
royal household to attend the needs of their august
and divine Lord. The fc taif of the corps was there-
fore quite long and the fording of the Orontes in all
likelihood took quite some time, from mid to late
morning through to perhaps early afternoon.
Perusal of the photograph of the Arab donkey team
and cart fording the river in what is thought to be
the general vicinity of the Egyptian crossing reveals

45

THE BATTLE OF QADE5H

46

DECEPTION

The army raised by
Muwatallish to contest
possession of the city of
Qadesh ( Kinza) with
Rameses l / was in all
probability the largest
ever ra ised by the Hit t it e
empire. Unlike that field-
ed by Egypt , it was very
much an 'allied* army.
Satellite kingdoms and
vassa l st a t es all t o n t ri b u t-
ed to the force raised by
the Hit tile king to destroy
the military ambitions of
Egypt in central Syria
and beyond.

► This map shows the
major features of the city
of Qadesh (Kinza) at the
time of the battle in 1300.
Rameses* camp on the
night of Day 8/9 has been
identified with the Kumu-
at El-HarmelfiV). The
forest of Robawi, through
which the corps of Am an
passed on the morning of
Day 9 was in the vicinity
of ( 1 2 j , Pa ss age oj the
Orontes was in all proba-
bility via the ford (*3 j at
Ribfa, referred to in the
inscriptions as being
* south of the town of
Sh a h t u n a '( V j . Pro m
there Atmtn made
S t ru ig ht away a cross the
plain to establish the
camp of Pharaoh (*!*) to
the north-west of Qadesh
( *8 j . 7 he jo ll o wn ig d ay
P* Re followed the same
route and was in the gen-
eral area of (VP) when the
Hit tile chariot force
crossed the Al-Mukadiyah
and assaulted them in the
flank . At this time the
bulk of the Hit the forces
remained in the camp at
Old Qadesh (Vj. The
Uadi Halid (A j marks
the eastern entrance to the
Eleut keros valley and it

was from there that the
Ne 9 arin made passage on
to the northern Plain of
Qadesh on the late morn-
ing of Day 10.

that the water reaches as high as mid wheel. The
passage of three thousand years has not, it would
seem, altered the rate of flow or direction oft he
Orontes here to any great degree. It does not take
much imagination to see that the fording of this
river by more than 500 chariots, 4,000 infantry,
numerous donkey teams and carts pulled by oxen
would have taken a very long time. The glib manner
in which some commentators speak of the ‘crossings
of fords' by Egyptians and I (tttites without consid-
ering the practical and time-consuming difficulties
involved verges on the credulous, Thar the business
was slow and laborious has very significant implica-

47

THE BATTLE OF QADESH

tions for understanding subsequent events.

It was shortly after the Orontes had been crossed
that two Shasu bedouin were encountered and
hauled before Pharaoh. There is no doubt in ihe
Bulletin that the information they proffered to
Rameses was false. Indeed, when questioned they
reported that Muwatallish and [he Hit rite army was
nowhere near Qadesh ‘...for the Fallen one of Haiti
[Muwatallish | is in ihe land of Khaleb, to the north
of Tunipb If indeed they had been briefed by the
Hittite monarch as to what to say to the young
Pharaoh, clearly Muwatallish knew his man. In a
deliberate ploy to massage the ego of the vain Egvp
tian king, the bedouin were told to say that it was
because Muwatallish was afraid of Pharaoh that his
army had not come to the city! The presumption
that this was a ruse by the wily Hittite monarch,
designed to lower Pharaoh’s guard, has done much
to establish his reputation as a clever strategist.
There can be no doubting the Hittite king's motiva-
tion. In the words of the Bulletin the Shasu were
dispatched specifically to ‘...prevent his majesty
from making ready to fight with the Fallen one of
Hatti\ An Egyptian army arriving on the Plain of
Qadesh in piecemeal fashion, deluded into believing
48

A This is the view of
Qadesh that Rameses and
the corps of Amun mould
have seen as they moved
up from the south. Qadesh
itself mould have stood
proudly against the sky-
line on the Bronze Age
mound marked 4 A \ The
line of vegetation marks
the Al-Mukadiyah tribu-
t a rj t of the Oro n t es . / /
mas across this and from
the tree line that the liit-
tile chariots would have
emerged to attack the
co rps oj P "Re . / n deed , th is

picture gives an excellent
view of the likely proxim-
ity of the Egyptian force
relative to the
Al-Mukadiya h when
attacked . The short dis-
tance and suit ability of
the ground for chariot
warfare shows horn diffi-
cult it mould have been
for the rapidly advancing
Egyptian column to have
had time to effect any
defens i ve d ep l oj > rn en t
befo re th e Hittite fo rce h / 1
the flank of the corps. ( P .
Parr)

it had arrived first, would not only need Lime 10
recover and prepare for battle but would have been
lulled into a false sense of security and therefore
would have been psychologically unprepared for rhe
storm about to break over them. With the Hittite
multitude in place and rested, Muwatallish could
deploy his army and force the battle long before
Rameses was ready, in the race for strategic advan-
tage on the Plain of Qadesh, Haul had indeed won!

DECEPTION

There was no attempt in Egyptian accounts to dis-
guise the gullibility of Pharaoh in accepting this
information at face value and in consequence
embarking on a course of action that brought the
Egyptian army to the verge of catastrophe. One can
only surmise that his mind had become so addled by
the vista of possibilities opened up by this purport-
ed news of Hatti’s non arrival at Qadesh that his
judgement became temporarily impaired. Perhaps
his still limited experience as military leader com-
pounded by a gratuitous self-confidence and strong
personal sense of his own destiny allowed him to
divine in this fortuitous turn of events the hand of
'his father’, the god Amun. Eschewing the need for
confirmation of the information from his scouts
and riding roughshod over the views of his senior
officers, he ordered the corps on to Qadesh forth-
with.

The exact position of the Egyptian encampment
has not been established, but it is very likely to have
been in almost the same position as that used by Seti
some years before. With access to a water supply it
would have been an appropriate site for the Eqyp-
tian army to camp and wait, so it was by now
assumed, the army of Hatti. In a manner that prefig-

A In this view of Tell have been uncovered in

Nebi-Mend from the the mid to tower ( south-

south-east , the Bronze ern) parts of the tell. (P.

Age mound lies on the Parr)

right of the tell. Hellenis-
tic and Roman levels

ured the caslra of the Roman legions of a millenni-
um later, the troopers of Amun set out their camp. A
defensive perimeter and embankment was dug and
the shields of the infantry were placed around the
top for added protection. \\ ithin the camp all was
being set up for an extended stay. At the centre was
placed a shrine to the god Amun and the great tent
of the Pharaoh wherein he could be attended by his
retinue. Certainly all was well, for, 'Ilis Majesty
took his seat on a throne of gold'. As depicted in the
reliefs of the battle the camp has an almost domestic
air about it. In the complacency of this balmy early
May evening with Pharaoh probably in fine fettle,
believing he had stolen a march on his opponent,
news arrived that must have shaken Rameses, albeit
only temporarily, to the very core.

One of Pharaoh’s scouts had returned with two
prisoners found lurking near the Egyptian encamp-
ment. Refusing to talk, they were subjected to a

49

THF BATTLE OF QADESH

▼ The view ofQadesh/
Hit tit e Kinza , as seen
from the north-east. The
/Unite encampment lay
in this direction hut some
miles further north at the
site of Old Qadesh. The
suggestion is that I Unite
movement towards
Qadesh would have been
screened by the vegetation
on the hanks of the
Orontes as much as by the
mound ofQadesh itself
The corollary , however .
must also be accepted. In
the absence of scouts
Muwatallish could not
have known the exact
time that Rameses
arrived and encamped on
Day 9 because the Egyp-
tian army on the plain to
the west was screened
from the Hittitcs. This
illustration is also signifi-
cant in showing how in
reality the movement of
the large Hittite army

from its base north-east of
Qadesh to the south of the
city would have been a
long and complex opera-
tion. It is highly doubtful
that Muwatallish would
have done this on the
morning of Day If) with-
out knowing the strength
of Rameses 9 army. ( P.
Parr)

► In this view from the
mound looking east it is
easy to see how Qadesh
dominated the surround-
ing plain . Clearly seen is
the slow meandering Jlow
of the Orontes in its old
age. It was not the
Orontes that Hittite char-
iots forded in order to
attack the corps ofP'Re
but the smaller
Al-Mukadiyah tributary
that flows in a north-
south direction to the west
of the tell . (P. Parr)

~5V ;\ v -t-'.
ft. **vl*.-:u*£ £ ' : *~Z

-£T

4 *.

50

DECEPTION

heavy beating before being dragged into the ‘Pres-
ence 1 . The questions Pharaoh put to them strongly
suggest that he had not at that time begun to sus-
pect the danger they represented. Then his majesty
said to them, ‘What are you?' Who they were as per-
sons did 110I interest him, but he wanted to know
who had sent them. In admitting to 'belonging 7 to
the King ol Haiti, the enemy scouts proceeded to
disabuse Rameses of l he notion lhai the Hit tile

army lay some days away to the north and that in
reality, 'They are furnished with their infantry and
their chariotry carrying their weapons of warfare,
and they are more numerous than the sand of the
river banks. See, they stand equipped and ready to
fight behind Qadesh the Old’. Rameses sat incredu-
lous and then aghast as the full implications of the
information rapidly sank home. As matters stood
there could be no avoiding the overwhelming proba-

51

THE BATTLE OF QADESH

^ Qadesh is depicted on
reliefs at Luxor , at the
Rameseum and at Ahu
Sim he l (seen here). All
three show variations in
city details according to
the particular artist , but
the principal features and
characteristics are clearly
presented. Qadesh is
shown as a well- fortified
city built atop a high
mound and surrounded by
rivers and a moat (some
say two moats). Two
bridges spanning the moat
gave access to and egress
from the city.

M In this recent topo-
graphical survey of Tell
Nebi-Mend there are a
number of features of
interest. The Bronze Age
mound , on which the
citadel of Qadesh , illus-
trated in the following
photograph , was sited , lies
to the north of the upper-
most line marked *A \

Both of those lines ('A')
mark the possible site of
the moat connecting the
River Orontes on the left
with Al-Mukadiyah on
the right. A much later
Roman or Byzantine
ditch is shown by 'B' with
denoting the position
of the Hellenistic/ Roman
settlement on the tell. (P.
Parr)

52

WHAT OF THE HITTlTES? — THE ADVANCE OF P'KE

bilitv that he and the Egyptian army stared absolute
disaster in the face* Hastily convening a conference
with his senior staff, Rameses revealed to them the
dire predicament into which his earlier decision had
led them* Concurrence was total that the only step
to be taken was to effect a very rapid concentration
of the three remaining corps on Qadesh. ‘Then
command was given lo the Vizier to hurry on the
army of His Majesty as they marched on the road to
the south of the town of Shabtuna so as to bring
them in where His Majesty was. 1 It also seems rea-
sonable to suppose thal a messenger was sent to
expedite the arrival of the Nc’arin on the following
day. To his chagrin Rameses realized that the Hit tile
monarch, who now ‘stood ready to the north-east of
the town of Qadesh \ had dearly outfoxed him and
that the initiative lay totally in the hands of
Muwatallish.

What of l he Hittitcs?

Any attempt to place the moves of Muwatallish and
the 1 h trite host in some plausible sequence relative
to Rameses 7 arrival at Qadesh must reject the
account in the ‘Bulletin' which has the Ilittite army
embarking on offensive action at the same time as
Pharaoh is in conference with his officers. There are
a number of reasons for this and they are worthy of
exposition.

Not the least of them is the presumption that if
the meeting of Rameses with his staff occurred in
the evening of Day 9, as indeed was argued earlier,
and we assume the account in the ‘Bulletin 7 to be
correct, we must posit a night attack by the Ilittite
king. While such a thing was not unknown at this
time, the description in the 'Bulletin' that speaks of
\... the wretched Fallen one of Haiti was come with
Ins infantry and his chariotry, as well as the many
foreign countries that were with him' implies that
the whole Ilittite host was involved. In the light of
the size of the I littite force we can only surmise that
such an operation, involving the crossing of the
river in the growing darkness, would be a recipe for
disaster. More importantly, the speed of the Hi trite
reaction to Pharaoh’s arrival implied by the Bulletin
means that the entire Hittite army was already
standing to, and had been throughout the day, to the
rear of Qadesh on the chance that Rameses would

arrive. Not only is the notion of 40,000 infantry and
more than 3,500 chariots waiting patiently in the
growing heat of the early Syrian summer with the
wind blowing dust off the plain and into their faces
a nonsense, it simply does not square at all with the
observation that Muwatallish could only have known
late on Day 9 that Rameses had in fact actually
arrived. This would have been far too late in the day
to begin deploying an army the size of that which
the Hittites had encamped to the north-east of
Qadesh*

Such Intelligence that he possessed had come to
ihe Hiuite king from two sources. The most impor-
tant of these was in all probability the two Shashu
bedouin who, having been released by the Egyp-
tians, scuttled back to their master with the news
that Rameses and the corps of Amun was in the
‘neighbourhood south of Shabt una\ The other
came from the scouts whom Muwatallish had dis-
patched later that day to identify ihe specific loca-
tion of Pharaoh’s camp. It seems eminently reason-
able to assume that other scouts apart from the two
captured were involved in reconnoitring the locale
of the Egyptians. Indeed, the lateness of the hour of
those captured does suggest they were sent out fol-
lowing receipt of the Intelligence from the bedouin
who had returned by late afternoon. We ean surmise
therefore that by the end of Day 9 the Hiltite king
knew the location of Pharaoh’s camp, but did not
know how many troops were there. The presump-
tion must be that Muwatallish, in the know ledge
that his army was fully rested and ready for combat,
had determined to take action of some sort on the
following day What is now at issue is the nature of
that action, because there are very good grounds for
supposing that at this stage neither he nor Rameses
was contemplating a full-scale battle on the morrow.

The Advance of P’Re

It was in the early hours of the morning of Day 10
when the Vizier approached the camp of the corps
of P 7 Re which, if earlier reasoning is sound, lay
bivouacked in the vicinity of the ford at Ribla. in the
cold, early morning light the troops were still sleep-
ing after the exertions of the previous day’s march.
Excepting the few teams on guard duty, the chariots
were all unhitched and ihe horses tethered. The

53

THE BATTLE OF QADESH

tranquillity of the dawn scene was broken by the
unexpected arrival of the chariot bearing Pharaoh's
chief minister. There followed a flurry of activity as
senior officers of the corps were awakened to hear
the urgent summons of their Lord. In an obvious
state of agitation the \ izier commanded them in the
name of Rameses to march forthwith on Qadesh.
Across the camp a succession of orders were barked
out, signal trumpets sounded and drums were beat-
en. Men still heavy from sleep were shaken or
kicked into consciousness and ordered to make
ready for a rapid departure. Notwithstanding the
urgency that now attended their exertions, it must
have taken the corps more than a few hours to pre-
pare to march as tents were taken down, horses fed
and the ass teams and ox-wagons loaded* The
Vizier, having received a fresh team of horses, had
54

already driven off southward to rouse the corps of
Ptah which lay ‘south of the town of Aronama* (the
commentarv linked to the reliefs at Abu Sim be l has
Pharaoh's butler and a mounted messenger attend-
ing n> I he same task* It is not unreasonable to sup-
pose that they were dispatched at different times on
the following day).

More hours were expended as P'Re forded the
Orontes, negotiating with some difficulty the banks
churned-up by the corps of Amun the previous day.
It is entirely conceivable that in the urgency to rein-
force Pharaoh the cohesion of the corps began to
break up once the western bank was reached. In
their desire to assist their Lord a certain degree of
military caution may well have been set aside, and
some of the chariot units may have been sent on
ahead. If, strange as it might seem, the troops of

COMBAT IS JOINED

A The line of vegetation
that lies across the picture
m a rks th e A l- M uka diya h
tributary of the (h antes.
Beyond is the plain on
mh ich l h e ha i tie l oo k
place , extending 3-d miles
to the foothills of the
Lebanese mountains. In
antiquity the plain mould
not have been cultivated
so it mould have been a
perfect arena for the
manoeuvre of masses of
chariotry, providing opti-
m am p hj w i ca l con did o ns
for their employment.

The Hitt lie attack on
P'Rc, which mould have
been marching from left
to right at some indeter-
minate distance front the
A l -M u k a diya h , mo it Id
have emerged from the
line of vegetation having
forded the tributary, ft is
easy to see horn, having
been scattered by the
assault on their flank,
there mas very little cover
for the panicking Tgjp-
tian so Id tent i many of
whom mould have been
ridden damn by the flit -
tites. (P> Parr)

P’Re were unaware that fighting was imminent, that
too would begin to explain what now came to pass,
in a real sense our ability to understand the
"battle’ that now took place turns heavily on whether
action was deliberately initiated by the Hitches or
whether what transpired was a mistake. Speculation
of this sort arises from a consideration of the part
that protocol played in determining the procedures
for giving battle in antiquity, and the extent to
which the Egyptians and I Ihtites at Qadesh were
governed by these. Armies would first encamp and
combat would be joined by agreement, not initiated
by surprise attack. Indeed, there is evidence to sug-
gest that in the Ancient Near East the employment
of surprise as a means of securing strategic military
advantage was not regarded as legitimate. It has
already been stressed that strategic surprise at

Qadesh was perceived by both sides in terms of
early arrival at the designated battleground. The
longer an army was rested prior to battle, the greater
its advantage in determining the outcome. Further-
more, respect for legal propriety and protocol were
characteristic of llittite relations with vassal states
and other powers. It is surprising therefore that
Muwatallish is held in high esteem for initiating
battle without observing the very protocol he may
well have taken great care to uphold. Now this may
or may noi have been the case al Qadesh, but there
arc more than a few pointers to suggest that what
has become known as "The Battle of Qadesh’ may
not have been the contest that either Rameses or his
Hill lie opponent desired or intended. Paradoxically,
what lias come to be regarded as the archetypal bat-
tle initiated by guile and ruse may in reality have
been anything but!

Combat is Joined

The sun was already climbing above ihe early morn-
ing mist when ihe corps of P’Rc, having (bided the
cold waters of the Or notes, began final assembly
prior to moving off in the direction of Pharaoh’s
camp which lay some 6 V? miles to the norih.

Word had already passed along the column from
the ‘mer-mesha’ that the march northwards would
be at a rapid pace, urgency was the order of the
moment! For the hncnfyP in the front ranks of the
infantry column, grizzled veterans of both Seti and
Rameses 1 earlier campaigns, the experience of the
battle march was hardly novel. For those whose first
campaign this was, however, the urgency of the past
few hours would have found them nervous and in a
state of anxiety, unsure of what was to come. Over
the past month many of the veterans would, after
their own fashion, have encouraged the "nefru’ now
assembled in the rear of the column. Notw ithstand-
ing the hard training these youngsters had received
in the 4 sekheperu’ under the ever watchful eye of
their harsh drill sergeants, it is clear that the long
march from Egypt and through Canaan had
exhausted many of them. For some, the care extend-
ed to these novice soldiers derived from a genuine
paternalism, more than a few of the veterans having
sons in the ranks with them for the first time. Such
was the visible expression of the generational com-

55

THE BATTLE OF QADESH

pact between Pharaoh and his army that allowed
many of these men their own land in Egypt as long
as a son was available when the time came to serve
their Lord in the ranks. Now the day had come to
repay their debt to Pharaoh on the field of bat lie.
Drifting along the column came the sound of the
battle trumpets, their single discordant notes merg-
ing in a cacophony of noise signalling the beginning
of the march. With a final barked order from the
‘tjai-seryt 1 , shields were slung across backs and
spears and bows shouldered as one after another,
with Standards raised high and to the fore, each *sa s
of infantry moved off. Soon a fast pace was being
set. Little could be seen to the left or right of the
column, the tramping feel and the chariots along
side raising clouds of fine dust to obscure all but the
scene immediately ahead. Over the din came the
taint sound of the battle songs of the "menfyL in the
van, while from the rear came the refrain of stranger
tongues signifying lhai the Nubian or Libyan auxil-
iaries were adding their offerings. But with the
onset of the morning heat, the dull pain of aching
limbs and the all-enveloping dust, the singing tailed
off and all became quiet save for the raucous cough-
ing of soldiers and the vibrating, rhythmic pum-
melling of thousands of marching feet. As Shabtu-
na fell away on the left of the column the view to the
north-east became increasingly dominated by the
tell of Qadesh, its great fortress standing proud
against the deepening blue of the skyline and gov-
erning the surrounding plain. Above the crenellated
battlements a large, striped Standard shaped like a
sail flew in the breeze. To the right of the column
and just over three-quarters of a mile away, a vivid
ribbon of green vegetation marked the beginnings
of Al-Mukadiyah, the tributary of the Oromes
which flowed alongside the base of the tell and then
to the south of the city. Here the scrub of the plain’s
edge gave way to a more luxuriant growth of bushes,
shrubs and trees that obscured the flatness beyond.
It was from this treeline, which offered such superb
cover, that a mass of Hittite ehariotrv now sortied,
hurtling upon the Egyptian corps. The Egyptian
ehariotrv screening the right flank of the column
had no time to react, being ridden down and sub-
merged by a tidal wave of vehicles. Hardly had the
heavier Hittite chariots begun lo accelerate on the
level of the plain than they were crashing into the
56

massed ranks of the Egyptian troops in the centre of
the column, their momentum temporarily dissipat-
ed. The right flank of the column of F’Re collapsed
as men were ridden down and crushed beneath the
wheels and hooves of the Hittite chariots. Long
spears flashed out to the left and right in an orgy of
killing as I Incite warriors thrust at the falling
infantry, the chariot drivers whipping their horses
to a lather as they ploughed further into the rapidly
disintegrating Egyptian ranks. Such was i he crush
and fear engendered by this ferocious assault that
discipline evaporated, little or no resistance being
put up by the infantry. Men east aside shields, bows
and other weapons. All was now panic as the cohe-
sion of the corps vanished. In minutes, all order had
gone in the face of this totally unexpected and
unforeseen assault. More and more Hittite chariots
rushed out on to the plain, emerging from a gap in
the trees that marked the passage from the ford
which minutes before they had crossed. Such was
the confusion caused by so many chariots concen-
trated in such a short space that more than a few of
the Anatolian machines overturned, flinging their
crews beneath the hooves and wheels of the chariots
behind. As the panic rippled through the Egyptian
column the men at the front turned to witness the
desperate predicament of their comrades. A broad
swathe had been bloodily hacked through the centre
of P’Re through which Hittite chariots were stream-
ing and accelerating across the plain beyond. Unlike
the lighter Egyptian machines, these heavier Hittite
chariots were unable to execute rapid turns or
changes of course without overturning. Moving
westwards they were able to employ the space of the
plain to begin a loping turn towards the north.

All happened so quickly that it took the senior
officers at the from of the column some moments to
establish what exactly was going on. Manoeuvring
their chariots to gain a clearer view, they saw the
corps disintegrating before their eyes; a wild melee
of rushing chariots and fearful troops dispersing to
all points of the compass. It was clear, however, that
it was the long line of Hittite chariots purposefully
heading on to a parallel track to ihc w est of the col-
umn, and seemingly oblivious of the Egyptian chaos
around them, that now posed the greatest threat.
There could be no doubling the Hittite intention.
Little could be done now to save P’Re, so without

THEHITTETE ASSAULT

► This variation in detail
is noticeable in the depic-
tion of Qttdesh at the
Ranieseimr. The rendition
is less well executed than
that at Abu Shnbel or at
Luxm\ but what remains
apparent, however, is the
very strong position of the
site .

further ado the Egyptian chariot squadrons milling
around at the head of the column were dispatched
north to warn Pharaoh of the imminence of the I lit
tile attach. With a crack of their whips the kedjen of
each chariot accelerated his team as rapidly as possi-
ble, mindful of the Hittite column by now on the far
side of the plain and on a matching course, trailing a
huge, rising plume of dust as they too accelerated
towards the camp of Annin and Raineses.

l he Hittite Assault

Throughout the early morning the sentries on the
shield wall in the camp of Amun had been under
orders to keep a sharp watch for evidence of the
advance of P'Re* The monotonous flatness of ihe
plain to the south made it difficult to see clearly the
onset of a large column of troops at a distance. This
was compounded by the heal haze which by mid
morning was causing the air to shimmer, and the
line dust whipped up In the wind from the surface
did much to diffract die clear light of this early Syr-
ian summer day. Although the camp had been tense
throughout the night following the alarming news of
the proximity of the Hittite armv on the far bank of
the Orontes, there was little suggestion that Amun
was in danger of attack. Combat ii was assumed was
still some days away, although there were few within

the shield wall who were so complacent that they
did not wish for the rapid arrival of the rest of the
army. As the process of pitching the camp had not
yet been completed it had been thought prudent to
keep at least some of the troops standing to arms
and a number of infantry companies and chariot
squadrons were held ready for action. If all went
well the corps of PRe and Ptah, having been sum-
moned in some urgency by Pharaoh's Vizier, would
arrive by nightfall with Sutekh following early the
next day. On the north wall other eyes were turned
to the mountains from where it was assumed the
Ne'arin would arrive shortly, having marched
through Amurru via the Eleutheros valley.

It was the urgent and insistent shouts from the
guards on the southern shield wall that gave the first
intimation that things were wrong. Jabbing fingers
on outstretched arms directed the attention of the
officers to the dust clouds coming up from the
south. While the cloud to the left was clearly
approaching the camp more quickly, that to the
right was growing visibly larger with every passing
moment. Experienced eyes quickly recognized the
telltale signs of chariots at speed and the shout went
out across the camp announcing the imminence of
their arrival, although uncertain as to their origin. It
was only by a margin of a few minutes that the first
of i he surviving chariots of P'Re raced into the

S7

THE BATTLE OF QADESH

I Having been awakened in
the early hours of (he
morning by the vizier of
Raineses // with an argent
summons to tome to
Pharaoh \ aid, the corps of
P 'Re crosses the Orotites at
the ford in the vicinity of
Rib la and begins a rapid
march across the plain
towards the camp of A man,
which fit's just over I iter
( approx. 7 miles) to the
north.

Corps oj P’Rt’

River

Orontes

2 The 1 1 it the king, hearing
of the arrival of Raineses
the previous evening, orders
a detailed reeo mi -a is sauce
in /one of the Egyptian
camp the foil owing
morning. . 1 large chariot
detachment moves south-
wards from the camp * then
skirts the tell on which
Qitdesh is sited , and crosses
the Orontes.

3 // is now probably mid-
morning and . having
traversed the cultivated
fields to the south of the tell,
t he M it tite elm rio t i ol mnn
crosses the Af-Mukadiyah
tributary and emerges from
the tree-line that has thus
far been shielding its
movements, ft finds itself
confronted by the north-
wards-movittg column of
PRc less than a mile away .

Egyptian corps and hack
t hei r wuj r t h rough . 7 h e
Egyptian screening chariots
on the right of the column
are swept away by the
onrush of the completely
it ne xpeet c d assn alt. I Vi l h i n
moments the Egyptian
column begins to
disintegrate.

5 At the head of the
Egyptian column a bloody
swathe is being cut through
the centre of P Re 's corps as

4 IVith momentum building
up in the column, and with
no space in which to
nut n oeuvre their chariots,
the flit tiles have no recourse
hut to i crash into A he

Plain of Qadesh

Hit tite chariots

xxxx

eg ER1

RAMLSES II

58

THE HITTITE ASSAULT

To Amurra

Camp of
R timeses 1 1
and Am tin

6 Seemingly uninterested in
bringing about the
des t rtt c t ion of P' Re. t he
Hit t ile eha i io t eo In nt n uses
the width of the plain of
Qadesh to begin a turn to the
north in order to carry oat
their primary orders of
reconnoitring the Egyptian
camp,

Homs

the line of Hittite chariots
still emerging on to the plain
from the tree-line hacks its
way through to the far side.
A number of Egyptian
t'h a rio ts a i e d is pa t til ed
northwards to warn
Pharaoh of the Hitt ite
a Hat h,

Lake of

Hitt ite

d is pe i si ng t o a 1 1 po in ts of the
compass. Nevertheless^ the
hulk of them survive, and
many make their wa y to
Pharaoh V camp by
night fall.

9 The Hittite column
crashes into the western side
of the camp ofAmun.

xxxx

encampment at
‘Old Qadesh'

MUWATALLISH

Possible vantage point of
Hitt it e K i ng M u wa tall is h

Qadesh

H i i ti te re co n na issa n ce
force

Af-Mukadiyah

7 In the Egyptian catnfi,
only a few troops are to arms
when the chariots of P 'Re
arrive with news of the
attack and the dust from the
Hit t ite column is made out
moving rapidly northwards.

8 The d isi n t cgra tio n o f t he
corps of P'Re seems total,
with the surviving troops

THE BATTLE OF QADESH

Phase One; The Hittite initial attack on the corps of P’Re and on the Egyptian
camp

59

THE BATTLE OF QADESH

camp, the "senenys 1 within pointing to the huge dust
plume that was even then resolving itself into a mass
ofHittite chariotry sweeping in from the west* The
wave of panic that swept through Amuifs camp was
almost tangible* In a mad scramble infantry grabbed
weapons that lay to hand and at the far end of the

camp there was frantic urgency among the crews as
they hitched up their teams to the chariot cabs. The
Hittites, now clearly apparent in a huge and seem-
ing!) endless column, swept around the western and
extreme northern end of the camp before crashing
through the shield wall to begin their assault.

M New Kingdom infantry
on the march are seen
clearly in this reproduc-
tion based upon mail
pa in t i ngs from The ha n
tombs. The close order
marching, with shields
slung across the back,
gives a good impression of
the a pp ca ra n ce of t h e
infantry of P Re when the
Hit life chariot attack mas
launched. It is easy to see
horn a very sudden high-
speed assault could have
led to panic and the subse-
quent disintegration of the
entire corps *

60

THE HITTITE ASSAULT

As the Anatolian warriors washed over the mass of
Egyptian troops at the western end of the camp
their surge was already beginning to dissipate. Char-
iots slowed as the numerous tents, stores and other
impedimenta became as rocks breaking the tide.
Amid the chaos of panicking Egyptian soldiers,
those who had been standing to arms throughout
the night sensed the slowing of the Hittite drive and
advanced with khopesh or spear in hand to attack
the enemy. A desperate hand-to-hand melee ensued
as the Egyptians pulled down Hittite crews from
their cabs or were transfixed by the long thrusting
spears of the enemy. Chariots slowed to a crawl as
horses struggled vainly to move forward, hemmed
in by their own kind as more and more chariots
crowded into the camp. Screams of the dying
merged with the whinnying of terrified horses as
they were killed by Egyptian archers firing into the
mass of chariot teams. As they ground to a halt or
collapsed, the crews were set upon by the Egyptians.
More than a few of the survivors recalled the
grotesque sight of Hittite crewmen hauled back-
wards by their long hair and dispatched by the
flashing downward stroke of the l menfvt’ khopesh.
More and more Hittite chariots ploughed into the
camp and it was becoming apparent that many of
the crews were less concerned with fighting Egyp-
tians than in laying hands on the immense booty.

No sooner had the assault on the camp begun than
Pharaoh’s bodyguard had deployed to bar access to
the royal enclosure. Veteran close-combat infantry
squared off w ith the Sherden warriors w ho, in their
horned helmets and with long swords in hand, pre-
pared to receive the I Iittite chariotry. Within all was
haste. Pharaoh was hurriedly informed of what had
transpired. Recovering rapidly from the surprise of
the news of P'Re and the Hittite attack on the camp,
he quickly, assumed the accoutrements of battle
and girded himself with his corselet’ and prepared
to give battle with his household chariotry and the
few squadrons readied for action at the rear of the
camp, as yet untouched by the Hittite assault.
Household staff rushed through the royal enclosure
with Pharaoh’s fan-bearer ushering the royal chil-
dren, including Pharaoh’s eldest son Prahiwenamef,
to the safety of the opposite end of the encampment
where they were placed under guard. His instruc-
tions to them were precise: l Do not go out on the

west side of the camp and keep clear of the battle.’
Donning the blue khepresh crown, Pharaoh mount
ed his chariot and with a terse command to Menna,
his kedjen, led the available chariotry of the corps
out of the eastern entrance of the camp at a fast gal
lop to begin deployment for a rapid counter attack
on the Hittite host.

The Egyptian column swept around towards the
north-west and rapidly deployed into line of battle.
As yet no Egyptian chariotry had taken on the Hit-
tite attackers whose attention was now almost totally
focused on the camp. Many were driving hither and
thither, running down Egyptian infantry as they
emerged from the camp in the hope of fleeing
north. Amid the chaos, however, it was clear that the
Hittites’ cohesion was already lost, and in the
milling of their numbers lay the opportunity for
Rameses to effect some recovery of the dire Egyp-
tian position. A rapid, albeit desperate and unsus-
pected counter-attack, exploiting the apparent
fatigue of the Hittite chariot teams, their lack of
cohesion, the dust cloud wafting across the field and
above all the power and range of the Egyptian com-
posite bows, was now launched. Under these condi-
tions the much greater size of the Hittite force
counted for little.

At a signal from Rameses the chariots began to
roll and gather speed as they headed towards the
milling mass of the enemy who appeared as yet to be
unaware of their presence. Exploiting the range of
their bows, the now rapidly moving Egyptians
loosed their arrows and in a process reminiscent of
their training procedures fired volley after volley
into the densely packed and slowly moving Hittite
chariot body. Approaching at speed, the Egyptians
were able to effect a number of battle turns without
making contact before the I littites, reacting slow ly
to the sight of their compatriots falling around them
and transfixed by arrows, realized they were under
attack. The disciplined fire of the Egyptian senenvs
began to execute a fearful destruction. It was unnec-
essary for them to target an individual team for the
concentration of the milling Hittite chariotry
allowed each arrow in a volley to find a target. Pon-
derously the I littites began to react to the counter-
attack. More than a few, whipping their now tired
teams, tried to close the distance with the Egyptians
but were shot down as they approached. The surviv-

61

THE BATTLE OF QADESH

ing mass, however, already sensing that the initiative
was slipping away attempted to disengage from the
combat in the camp and effect a withdrawal to the
south. They began to stream away in a disorganized
rabble, heading back across the plain as fast as their
rapidly tiring teams could pull them. In their rear
Rameses, perceiving the shift of the flow of combat
in his favour, ordered forward the still fresh Egyp-
tian chariotry. A great cry went up from the troops
in the camp, who only minutes before had been
fighting for their very survival. Scampering over the
mass of debris and ruined chariots, dead and dying
men and horses that now littered the western end of
the camp, they followed in the wake of the chariots
racing past them, impromptu chariot runners deter-
62

mined to wreak vengeance upon their foes.

With Rameses in the van the Egyptian chariots
swept around the western end of their devastated
camp in pursuit of the retreating Hittites. More
accurate archery was needed as the Hittite vehicles
dispersed into individual targets. As the Egyptians
closed the distance the fearful Hittite drivers
whipped heir teams to a lather. The horses, howev-
er, now exhausted by the prolonged combat, slowed
appreciably as they raced across the plain, seeking
the security of the river. Without hesitation the
Egyptian archers transfixed them and their crews
with arrows and javelins. The retreat was rapidly
becoming a rout as the passage of the Hittite force
became littered by crashed and broken chariots. For

4 Rameses II, courtesy of
Yul Rrynner! This picture
has been used to allow a
closer view of the weapon-
ry carried by a Rameside
chariot at Qadesh and in
particular that of the
Pharaoh himself The
reproduction chariot was
based on that showing
Rameses in the Rameseum
reliefs and is reproduced
elsewhere in this boob .
dearly seen is the com-
posite how in its case
attached to the side of the
cab , the long heavy arrows
and the javelins used
when forced into close
combat or employed after
the arrows had been
exhausted .( BFI)

► Based upon a relief of
Rameses found on the sec-
ond pylon of the north
tower on the western wall
of the Rameseum. The
small bronze scale armour
corselet is clearly rendered
and such is also seen
employed on the horses.
The Hittites are also
depicted wearing scale
armour. On the original
painting they are coloured
red and blue signifying
either that they were actu-

THE HITTITE ASSAULT

ally painted or simply
vows of sea l es a l tern a t i ng
mi ih stile h i ng. 7 he / eng t h
of the heavy arrows is
up pa ren t . Signifi cant / j t
horses are as frequent a
target as the Hit the war-
riors who lie on the
ground.

► 7 photograph of the
image on the reliefs upon
which the previous picture
was based. The tri-
umphant pose of Pharaoh
in his chariot firing his
composite how and his
horses trampling his ene-
mies underfoot was a
common artistic conven-
tion of the time.

63

THE BATTLE OF QADESH

chose that survived the destruction of their vehicles
but lay pinned down or badly injured on the ground
death came quickly, Egyptian foot soldiers following
in the wake of the chariots dispatched them and
hacked off a hand as a grisly trophy to prove their
bravery so that after the battle the scribes could note
their names as they contended for Pharaoh's atten-
tion and the "gold of valour*.

Excursus One

\\ hat has been presented thus far is an attempt to
render a coherent and realistic scenario of the some-
what terse accounts of the opening phases of the
Hittite attack on P’Re and the assault on the camp
of Amun given in the Poem and the Bulletin. A
number of important points have been implied in

64

tins account which are at variance with the tradi-
tional interpretation of the lexis and the manner in
which they have been represented in other com-
mentaries and descriptions of the battle.

The first and most significant of these concerns
the reaction of P'Re to the Hittite attack 'That the
corps disintegrated is accepted as being the likely
outcome of its having been surprised on the march.
But the on q uesri oned presumption, accepted by
Rameses (although he may have had other motives
for propagating this explanation of events) that P'Re
panicked because they were skittish and cowardly
seems at best dubious. It is more credible that such
panic as did ensue was caused by the surprise and
ferocity of the Hittite attack under conditions in
which the Egyptians were totally unprepared and
unable to respond This was in all probability com

EXCURSUS ONE

7 ] |

c -*

Q 0 1

A 77u* image employed here is based upon one of a
number of reliefs at Luxor depicting the Battle of
Qadcsh. Several observations need to be made concern-
ing Egyptian artistic conventions prior to explaining
its content. The first concents the size of figure: the
larger it is the more important the person. Thus Raine-
ses dominates the scene. In addition the relief depicts
in one image many events that were separated in time ,
so it is important to bear in mind the time-frame sug-
gested in the text and place the events depicted in the
relief in that context. In ('A') Pharaoh sits on his
"golden throne' with his back to the camp. He is
approached by a group of senior officers who break the
news to him that the Hit tile king and his army, far
from being "to the north of Tun ip" are already
encamped in the vicinity of Qadcsh. Above the officer
group Pharaoh's chariot and his horses 1 Victory-in -
Thebes' and "Xiut -is-contented' are readied for battle
by his driver and shield-bearer Menna. In the register
below this scene ( "B ') is shown the beating of the Hit-

tit e scouts caught late in the evening of Day 9. The text
associated with the scene reads , "The coming of
Pharaoh *s scout bringing two scouts of the Fallen one
of Haiti into the Pharaoh's Presence. They beat them
to make them say where the wretched Fallen one of
Haiti was . ’ ("C') gives a remarkable insight into the
earliest known depiction of a military camp which is
enclosed by the shield wall ("I '). Apart from the royal
enclosure there arc unhitched chariots and horses , don-
keys and other beasts of burden and the supplies they
have brought. This calm atmosphere changes as the
Hittite chariots reach the camp and begin to assault it
("/)'), tempted by the booty within. To the left of the
royal enclosure Egyptian soldiers can be seen dragging
Hittite crews from their chariots and dispatching them
with their kliopesh swords and bronze daggers. There
are a number of Egyptian chariots in action which
belies the claim of Raineses that "he stood alone' before
the Hittite chariotry. "E' illustrates Pharaoh's Sherden
bodyguard with their characteristic horned helmets.

65

THE BATTLE OF QADESH

pounded by an expeclation as they marched singlc-
mindedly to join Amun that combat was not immi-
nent! We are talking about one of the senior corps of
the professional Egyptian army with a long and dis-
tinguished history and with much experience of
fighting the Hit tiles. The notion that what tran-
spired arose from their collective cowardice is not a
credible explanation for their dissolution as a coher-
ent fighting unit. Indeed, the Poem implies that
many troops of P’Re were able to reach Pharaoh’s
camp with news of the attack. This does not suggest
that everyone in the corps had lost his head!

What is most intriguing about the Hittite attack is
that P’Re was not totally destroyed. By nightfall
many of the troops had recovered to Pharaoh’s
camp. Wherein therefore lies the purported pre-
science attributable to Muwatallish in stationing his
chariots in just the position to assault P’Rc as it
marched across the plain if the intention were not to
destroy it? If Muwatallish desired the defeat of
Ramoses, destruction of Pharaoh’s army rather than
its scattering must have been his prime intention.
Only by this means would he have been able to
inflict upon Raineses the decisive outcome his strat-
egy required. Why then, having found P’Re isolated
and unprepared, did he not destroy the corps? It is
really too disingenuous to argue that the Hittite
chariotry had orders only to scatter the troops of
Raineses. Indeed, it is a palpable nonsense to believe
that the Hittite chariotry could only manage to
achieve such a limited and contrived objective! Fur-
ther grist to the mill derives from the failure of
Muwatallish to deploy his infantry to effect the
destruction of the Egyptian corps. Chariotry alone
could not have defeated P’Re. Infantry would have
been needed to follow-up the initial success of the
purported surprise assault. In fact I Iittite battlefield
tactics presumed as much. The claim that he delib-
erately chose to employ his chariotry and conscious
ly eschewed the use of his infantry is not tenable.
Given the close proximity of the ford to the Egvp
tian column, the Hittite infantry would have needed
to advance only a very short distance to close with
the enemy. 'That they did not do so is highly signifi-
cant. Such a major omission on the part of
Muwatallish is very difficult to explain away and is
inconsistent with the cunning and skill he is pur
ported to have displayed in the battle. Such reason-

ing, however, takes at face value the Egyptian claim
that the Hittite infantry were actually deployed for
battle at Qadesh. There are strong grounds for
believing that this was not the case. If the purpose
of the surprise attack on P’Re were to maximize the
military advantage to the I Iittites of attacking isolat
cd elements of the Egyptian army on the march, it
must be argued that far from being the remarkable
coup it has always been assumed, the Hittite attack
was in reality a failure!

It is the contention of the author that the I Iittite
attack on the column was conducted on a very nar
row frontage and that they were more concerned
w ith cutting through the corps of P’Re than seeking
its destruction. Why should this be? Quite simply,
far from seeking to attack P’Rc, the I Iittite force did
not know of its presence on the Plain of Qadesh
prior to crossing the ford, and that its designated
task was actually to undertake a reconnaissance in
force of Pharaoh’s camp. Muwatallish, aware of
Pharaoh’s presence, lacked as yet the Intelligence
detailing the size of the Egyptian force. On posses-
sion of that information turned his willingness to
deploy his forces for battle. Until such time as the
first Hittite chariots emerged from the tree line and
saw the corps of P’Re marching directly across their
line of advance, they had no idea that the Egyptians
were actually there. Given the size of the corps and
its tail of ox-wagons, ass trains and so on, the col-
umn would have been about two miles in length and
its line of march parallel to and not less than half a
mile from the Mukadiyah tributary of the Orontes.
This was a very short distance for a chariot to tra-
verse. The time lapse between leaving the treeline of
the Mukadiyah and crossing the half-mile of ground
before hitting the right flank of P’Re would have
been at the most a few r minutes. This would not
have given the Hittites or the Egyptians time to

► Egyptian 19th Dynasty
chariot. In essence there
was little difference
between this Egyptian
chariot and that ridden
by Ranteses II shown on
page 63. The perspective
does allow a good view of
the wide wheel-base and
the rear-mounted axle
that endowed the Egyp-

tian vehicle with a superi-
or manoeuvrability to
that of its Hittite equiva-
lent. The task of the run-
ner would have been to
follow as quickly as possi-
ble after the chariot and
dispatch or capture Hit-
tites wounded or rendered
hors dc combat in the
charge. (Angus McBride)

66

EXCURSUS ONE

67

THE BATTLE OF QADESH

react. Certainly there was no space at all for the Hit-
tites to manoeuvre in order to avoid the Egyptian
column. With the Hittite force building-up to their
rear as more chariots crossed the ford, the lead vehi-
cles would have had no alternative but to drive into
the Egyptian ranks and hack their way through!

Such would seem to be implied by Gardiner in his

translation of the Qadesh inscriptions when he ren-
ders the account of the attack in the Poem as, ‘...
now they came forth from the south side of Qadesh
and broke into [?| the army of P’Re in its midst as
they were marching and did not know nor were they
prepared to fight’. ‘Broke into’ would seem to be the
most apposite term in this context to describe the

▼ The second of the graphic images based on the wall
reliefs from Luxor concern the course of the fighting
following the surprise Hittite attack on the camp of
Amun. In ('A') Raineses, shown far larger than any
other person on the battlefield , is depicted charging
single-handed into the mass of Hittite chariotry. In the
Abu Simhel reliefs a mounted rider is shown hurrying

on the corps of Ptah whereas in the Luxor reliefs a
chariot is hurriedly sent to summon them to the battle-
field; whereas in (*C f ) Ptah arrives at the battlefield
at a time at variance with the events shown in ('A'). If
the reasoning offered in the text is valid Ptah would
have had to make a very rapid forced march through-
out the course of Day 10, arriving at Qadesh probably

68

EXCURSUS ONE

Ilinite tactic! It is a post factum rationalization by
both ancient and modern commentators that has
ascribed to Muwatallish this foresight in launching
his assault on the corps of P’Re. His reputation has
benefited greatly from what was in all likelihood a
remarkably fortuitous coincidence. In reality the
Hit cite chariot crews were as surprised to see the

by mid afternoon . // is noticeable how Pmh '$ role in
ike haute is underplayed in the * Poem' and the ‘ Bul-
letin \ The timely arrival of the Ne'arin ( + D 7 earlier
in the da y undoubtedly saved Rameses from destruc-
tion. In ('E') retreating Hittite chariots are shown
entering Qadesh itself, leaving in their make a ft eld
strewn with their dead. One of the stranger aspects of

Egyptian column as their enemies were to be
assaulted by them. The most telling testimony to
this hypothesis is the track of the Hittite chariots
north to Pharaoh’s camp leaving behind the wreck
of a shattered, but not destroyed Egyptian corps.

To propose the view that the Hittite chariot col-
umn was not engaged in a planned assault on P’Rc

the Hittite strategy (if we assume the Egyptian
accounts to he accurate) was the failure of
Muwatallish ('T'} to commit his infantry to support
the chariot attack. They supposedly matched the Egyp-
tian counter-attack from the opposite hank of the
Orontes,

o « f.

69

THE BATTLE OF QADESH

H mites panicle and begin to
disengage and retreat south.
4 With the Egyptian
chariots in pursuit , the
Hitites retreat as fast as
their rapidly tiring chariot
teams allow , back towards
the Al-Mukadiyah.

2 Rameses dons his battle
armour and rapidly leads
out a number of squadrons
of his chariotry via the
eastern gate of the camp to
counter-attack’ the Hittites.

3 With the Hittite
attention seemingly fixed
on the camp and the lure of
the booty within , the
Egyptian force is able to
deploy and attack the dense
mass of enemy chariotry
with relative impunity .
Rameses and his men pour a
withering fire into the
tighly packed ranks of the
now very slow-moving
Hittites. With their own
momentum spent, and now
under fierce attack, the

Shabtuna

I Attracted by the prospect
of booty, the Hittite chariot
force crowds in on the
western end of the Egyptian
camp. Some of the Egyptian
soldiers recover and begin to
fight back. The Sherd en
bodyguard of the Pharaoh
deploy to block any Hittite
advance on the royal
enclosure. The royal princes
are moved to the eastern
end of the camp for their
protection.

Egyptian counter-attack
Plain of Qadesh

xxxx

RAMESES II

70

THF BATTLE OF QADESH

To Amurra

S The Egyptian^ with
Raineses at their head,
chase the Hit tiles, very
rapidly transfixing many
ere tvs by arrow-fire.
Infantry following up from
the camp mop up behind the
chariots.

Lake of Homs

Ca mp of
Rameses II
and A mint

Qadesh

Possible vantage
point of Hit tide King
MumitaHhh

6 Muwatallish , vie ip mg
events from a vantage point
slightly to the north of
Qadesh, witnesses the
unfolding defeat of his
chariot font'. He orders a
diversionary attack on the
Egyptian camp hut has only
his immediate entourage to

hand; this comprises many
high-ranking Hit tile and
allied leaders. It is they mho
non* form an ud hoc force,
which crosses the Oroutes
with some difficulty and
begins to advance on the
camp of Annin.

Hitt it €
encampment
at *Old
Qadesh '

River Orontes

xxxx

ht |5^I

MUWATALL1SH

THE BATTLE OF QADESH

Phase Two: The Egyptian counter-attack and the Hittite
second crossing of the River Orontes

71

THE BATTLE OF Q AD ESN

but had in reality embarked upon a major recon-
naissance of the camp of Amun to ascertain the
exact size of the Egyptian force raises profound
implications for other aspects of the accepted view
of the battle* Of these the "stand of Rameses 1 , alone
and abandoned by his chariotry, stands high in the
ranks of tall stories* While the Bulletin proceeds to
speak of the Hittite force as simply "the host of the
Hatti enemy \ the Poem details that Rameses, "found
2,500 chariots hemming him in on his outer sidc\
This figure, quoted with uncritical abandon by
nearly all commentators of the battle, is quite fanci-
ful* This much can be ascertained from a considera-
tion of the length of time required by such a large
force to cross the ford. A simple mathematical for-
mula is sufficient to make the point. Allowing just
one minute for each chariot to cross the ford (and it
would certainly have taken longer than that!), it
would have taken the 2,500 Hittite vehicles more
than 41 hours to complete the task. Even if two
chariots crossed together the point would still be
well made, notwithstanding the halving of the time
taken! The principle is also relevant to the second
wave of 1,000 chariots where a mere 16V: hours
would have been required to effect the crossing.
Even if we accept these figures at face value, how
was it that the Egyptian camp survived at all if such
numbers of chariots were involved? The first wave
of 2,500 Hittite chariots would have been more than
adequate to have swamped the encampment whatev-
er the degree of resistance Rameses and his available
chariotry could have put up. We are dealing in the
Poem with figures that are in reality the total for the
72

A Of the nineteen allied
and vassal states present
with f h e Hi tti tes a ml
listed in the Qadesh
inscriptions of Rameses
1 1 , th e l ea d ers oft we l ve
oft h era a re il / ns t ra ted i n
this section of a relief
from Luxor. None is
specifically identified on
the relief itself although
the manner of dress,
weaponry carried and
ha i r a 7 j ' / e ha ve alio wed
some to he tentatively
identified with the later
images of captured 'Sea
Peoples 'found on the
walls of the temple of
Rameses III at Midi net
I la hit ,

w Again from the Ra mu-
seum ^ this photograph
sh o ws Pha ra o h \s ch a 1 7 o i ,

albeit only the front legs
of It is team in the top
left- hand corner, attack-
ing a mass of Hittite
chari otry. Many of the
Hit tiles lie dead „ pin-
ioned by the long arrows
fired from the Egyptian
co m p os i t e h o ws . Th e
numbers of the dead were
so great that in the Poem
Rameses states , 7 caused
the field to grow white
(Gardiner uses 7 igh 1 ')
for those oj the (and of
Hatti * * making a refer-
ence to the long, light-
en loti r ed ga i men / wo rn
h ) 1 m a nj * Hi it it e ch a rio-
t eet s . Cert a i nly not all
wore (he long scale
armour shirts. 7 he I igh t -
col o it red ga rn ien / ma y
well have been fairly
thick textile armour.

full chariot forces available to the Hi tti tes for the
Qadesh campaign and not in any way the number of
chariots which Rameses actually fought. Positing a
much smaller initial Hittite chariot force, it still
would have been sufficient to have effected the dis-
integration of P\Re and also to have severely com-
promised the Egyptian position at the camp of
Amun, The pictorial relicts of the battle show only
Hittite chariots and their three-man crews in com-
bat with the Egyptians. Many of the Syrian allies of
Hatti, however, deployed "mariyanniP, chariot ry

EXCURSUS ONE

73

THE BATTLE OF QADESH

Lr

74

THE HITTITE SECOND WAVE

^ In the process of exe-
cuting the reliefs at the
Rameseum a number of
changes mere introduced
by the art hr which neces-
sitated translating images
originally of Egyptian
charioteers into Hit tries.
They are therefore exam-
ples of palimpsests* fur the
earlier work can clearly
be seen . While the artist
modified the shields to
represent those of the type
employed by Hitt lies, the
number of crew remained

as for the Egyptian vehi-
cle .

A From the Rameseum,
an excellent view of an
Egyptian chariot racing
into combat. Unusually
in this case the 'seneny 1 or
archer is holding forth the
shield rather than the
kedjen. Clearly shown is
the grab rail extending
forward from the top of
the cab .

derived from the Hurrian military tradition with
two-man vehicles, using tactics more akin to those
of the Egyptians, and these would in all probability
have been deployed in their own units and not
mixed with those of the Hittites. Those encountered
by Pharaoh in the initial wave were in all probability
therefore an exclusively Hi trite force and this

requires that their numbers were as low as 500 char-
iots — a much more credible figure! The inability of
the mass of the chariotry of Amun to react to this
attack because of their un prepared ness for combat
would nevertheless have meant that Pharaoh and the
smaller Egyptian force that did manage to engage
would have perceived themselves as, in some real
sense, lighting the whole charintry of the Hittite
army\ This in no way demeans the 'stand of Raine-
ses’, There can be no doubting that his prompt
action in leading such chariot forces as were avail-
able for l he counter-attack prevented the destruc-
tion of Amun, The excessive embellishment dis-
cernible in the accounts cannot deny the remarkable
leadership displayed by Pharaoh for in a very real
sense it was the personal bravery of Rameses that
saved the day for the Egyptians.

The Hittite Second Wave

For Muwatallish, viewing the proceedings from a
vantage-point near Qadesh, events were hardly

75

THE BATTLE OF QADESH

turning out as had been expected. While it was clear
that the hulk of the Egyptian army had yet to arrive,
the precipitate action of his chariot force in attack-
ing Pharaoh's camp had initiated combat before it
was intended. Even so, Rameses had managed to
retrieve the situation and was even now proceeding
with some success to destroy a sizable number of the
invaluable Hittite chariotry. W ithout assistance very
few of the chariots dispatched a short time before
would return. Matters urgently required t hat a
diversion be created to take pressure off the retreat-
ing troops and draw Rameses back toward his camp.

W ith so few troops available, the Hittite king had
only his entourage to hand. These had joined him to
view the proceedings unfolding on the plain below,
and were no doubt the last to expect to end up in
combat. It was to these Muwatallish now turned
with the request that they form a chariot force with
a view to crossing the river and assaulting Rameses'
camp. Among them were some of the foremost men
of the Hittite army, including ‘children and broth-
ers' of the king and a number of the leaders of the
allied contingents. Without hesitation, in loyalty to
their Lord, the chariots were mustered into an ad
hoc force and made off to cross the river at a point
fairly close to Pharaoh’s camp.

Passage of the Orontes was made with some diffi-
culty, but having concentrated on the far side the
force began to advance at a rapid pace towards the
eastern end of the camp. Barely had the first I Iittite
chariots begun to penetrate the encampment than
they were assaulted in a furious fashion by a bodv of
Egyptian and allied chariotry that had appeared
totally unexpectedly from the north. The long-
awaited Ne’arin had finally arrived and at the
moment of direst need for Pharaoh. Having divest-
ed themselves of their slower moving infantrv which
lay some miles to the rear along the line of march,
the chariotry had stormed on to join Pharaoh. With
his own surviving chariotry only now beginning to
recover from seeing off the first Hittite force to the
south of the camp, no appreciable forces were left to
defend his own vulnerable encampment wherein
were sheltering the royal princes and household!
Later, Pharaoh would have inscribed on the walls of
his mortuary temple at Thebes, ‘... the Ne'arin
broke into the host of the wretched Fallen one of
Hatti as they were entering the camp of Pharaoh
76

and the servants of His Majesty killed them...’

In a repetition of Rameses’ rout of the first wave
of chariotry, the Ne’arin unleashed massed volleys
of arrows into the ranks of the Hittites who, unable
to close with their enemy, could not defend them-
selves. I he I Iittite force visibly wavered, then began
to retreat, its own passage back to the river made
doubly horrendous by the appearance from the
south of Pharaoh and elements of his chariotry
(including possibly lead elements from Ptah). In a
running battle all the way back to ihe river the
Egyptians poured a withering fire from their com-
posite bows into the now rapidly depleting Hittite
ranks whose passage was marked by a wrack of
smashed and crashed vehicles and a litter of white-
shrouded bodies. Desperate to save their lives the
leading charioteers plunged into the Orontes in a
fatalistic bid to escape the rapidly closing Egyptians.
A chaos of men, horses and chariots soon marked
the recrossing of the Hittite force, with some among
them lucky enough to regain the far bank while oth-
ers were washed away bv the current or dragged
down by the weight of their armour.

With the retreat of the last of the Hittite chariotry
to the east bank of the Orontes, the combat was to
all intents over. Pharaoh retired to the wreckage of
his camp, while all over the plain infantry hacked off
the hands of the Hittite dead so as to allow the
scribes to compile lists of the numbers of the I Iittite
fallen. To these were added the prisoners, many of
whom had been recovered from the wrecked chari-
otry of the second Hittite assault. As with the dead,
it was clear that there were many of high rank and
status among them. The arrival of the corps of Ptah
late in the day was matched by the slow trickling
into the camp of many of the soldiers of Amun and

► The Egyptian artists
have gone to great trouble
to depict the full infantry
strength of the Hittites
drawn up in front of
Qadesh , top right of the
picture. None of these
troops was committed to
battle and if the reason-
ing offered in the text is
correct they were possibly
not present at all , hut

rather still in camp to the
north-west of the city .
Shown clearly in the bot-
tom left-hand corner are
Hittite charioteers being
hauled from the water ,
having been chased there
by the Egyptian chari-
otry.

THE HtTTITE SECOND WAVE

an

77

THE BATTLE OF QADESH

1 Having traversed the
Ormttes , the second Hitt he
column begins its approach
to the Egyptian camp .

2 This coincides with the
fortuitous arrival of the

AV V* rc'w ipAa, having

traversed Amurru via the
E lent her os valley, assault
the second Hittite wave as it
attacks the camp.

3 Recoiling in the face of
this unexpected assault, the
Hittite column disengages
and begins a rapid flight
hack towards the Grout es
in some disarray and panic.

Plain of Qadesh

Camp of Humeses // and Amun

Shabcuna

■ d*

i :: * ■.

4 Paralleling the Hittite
line of retreat, the ,\v T arin
chart o try pour a withering
arrow-fire upon the depleted
Hittite ranks.

5 From the south come the
chariots of Ram eses, who
has hy now been alerted to
the situation. Caught
between the two Egyptian
faeces, the Hittite retreat
becomes a rout.

6 7 h e Hittite survivn r$
plunge headlong into the
river in a bid to reach the
safety of the far hunk and
other Hittite forces wailing
there. Many are drowned
while others, including the
King of Aleppo, survive to he
dragged from the water.

M-hAukodiyob

7 Survivors of the
Hittite first wave re-crass
the Al-Mukadiyah to safety.

8 During the course of this
'battle \ or shortly after, the
leading elements of the corps
of Ptah arrive at Qadesh
after a forced march with
fresh chart o try and
infantry, to be followed
later the same day by the
corps of Sit tekh. Some
interpretations of the battle
have it continuing into a
second day.

x xxx

RAMLSES II

78

THE HITTITE SECOND WAVE

Qadesh

Lake of Homs

River Orontes

Hittite
encampment
at 'Old
Qadesh '

Possible vantage point of Hittite King Muwatallish

xxxx

MUVVATAI.LISH

THE BATTLE OF QADESH

Phase Three: The Hittites’ second attack and the intervention of Ne’arin

79

THE BATTLE OF QADESH

P’Re who had been 'discomfited’ by the respective
Hittite assaults. Their fate, however, as indeed that
of the Egyptian campaign itself, now waited on the
pronouncement of Pharaoh. Raineses had listened
in silence to rhe congratulations of his senior offi-
cers on his personal prowess in Lite battle but had
then subjected them to a withering tongue lashing
and had given vent to his wrath on she pitiful con-
duct of his troops in ihe face of the enemv. As
‘Use-mare Setpenre, Ramcscs Meryamun sat on his
gold throne, brooding in his tent long into the
night, there were many who sensed they had much
to fear on the morrow.

Excursus Two

That the second wave of Hittite chariots was sent to
attack Raineses’ encampment in order to draw off
pressure from those of their kind in the south of the
plain cannot be seriously doubted. It was fortuitous
for Rameses and decidedly unlucky for the Hittites
that their penetration of the eastern end of the
80

A Amid the battle scene
is to be found a mounted
rider no doubt carrying
information or orders to
some pari of the battle-
field. Immediately
beneath him is a trans-
fixed Hittite warrior
clearly identifiable by the
lo ng h a i r t ha t p ran tpted
Rameses to refer to them
disparagingly as 'women
soldiers \ In the Abu Sim-
bel reliefs it is a mounted

rider who is seen
approach mg the corps of
Ptah. The text associated
with the relief states, *The
scout of Pharaoh being
come to hurry on the
a rtny o f Ptah , 7 he re was
said to them: “Go ahead %
Pharaoh your Lord
stands hi the battle quite
alone . " 1

encampment was being effected ai exactly the same
time as the Ne’arin were making l heir appearance
on the scene. It would seem thal their existence was
totally unbeknown to the Hittites. Much specula-
tion has been expended on the identity of this
'Egyptian’ unit. The difficulty arises mainly from
the imprecise meaning of the term Ne’arin. One of
its principal uses comes from its association with
the 'Semitic’ background of those of whom it is

EXCURSUS TWO

normally employed. The presumption has therefore
been that they were a Canaanite mariyannu detach-
ment in the service of Pharaoh. However the view
has also been offered that they are identical with the
T. hrsl battle-force out of all the leaders of the
army, and they were upon the shore of the Land of
Amor 1 spoken of in the Poem.

Indeed, the depiction of the arrival of the Ne’arin
at Qadesh in the Luxor reliefs shows them driving
chariots of Egyptian style and employing the same
tactics. A credible case has been offered for their
being identified with the fourth army corps of
'SiiLekh\ the Semitic connotation being in the all u
sion to its liilc and possibly the larger numbers of
Semitic troops serving in its ranks. Indeed, the
sweep through Amurru via the Eleutheros valley
may have been designed not only to steady Ben-
icshina but to ensure the presence of his own chari-
otrv at Qadesh. The vagueness of the position with
which Sutckh is spoken of in the inscriptions lends
credibility to the Ne’arin being identified with that
corps.

A In the make of the
Egyp t ia n co un ter-a t ta ck
on the second wave of
Hitt it e chariotry* many
of the crews- ended up
being driven hack into the
Grant es, This image from
the Rameseum with its
a t ta ch ed co m men l a ry
shows, L. 77?;* wretched

Ch iefo f Kh a ieh (A lep po )
being emptied / of water}
by his soldiers after His
Majesty had thrown him
into the water, *

It is clear that Muwatallish had little choice but to
employ those immediate forces close to his person if
he were to salvage any chariots from ihc first wave.
That this was a scratch force seems very likely given
the names of high-ranking figures in the Hitt he
army slain and captured and listed in the Ramese-
um. It seems reasonable to infer that under normal
circumstances such a large number of dignitaries
would not have fought in the battle had the mass of
ordinary chariot rv been available. This hypothesis is
further strengthened if it is argued that, contrary to
the inscriptions and reliefs, the mass of Ilittite

31

THE BATTLE OF QADESH

M Libyan archer. As with
the Nubians , the Egyp-
tians incorporated Libyan
auxiliaries into their
army. While some would
have worn aspects of
Egyptian dress , the archer
shown here wears little
save the leather phallus
cover and cloak made
from bull-hide or giraffe
skin , which provided a
modicum of protection
against arrow fire. Hair
was plaited , with an
ostrich feather for decora-
tion. (Angus McBride)

infantry was not present on this occasion either.
The notion that Muvvatallish had brought his
infantry but not his chariotry is untenable. The
absence of one implies the lack of the other. Any
small number of infantry present, perhaps to guard
his person, could not have been employed for the
task which the ad hoc chariot force was dispatched
to serve.

There is a very great deal to suggest that Qadesh
was far from being the great battle assumed and
presented in so many other accounts. Indeed, nei-
ther Rameses nor Muwatallish fought the ‘battle’
each expected or had planned for. A completely

unplanned series of events transformed a limited
Hittite reconnaissance into a running combat that
nevertheless came very close to destroying the camp
of Amun and killing Pharaoh. But its consequences
were much as if the proper battle had actually been
fought. Notwithstanding the Egyptian recovery, the
bravery of Pharaoh and the tactically superior show-
ing of the Egyptian chariotrv, the dislocation of his
army dashed Pharaoh’s wider strategic aspirations.
It is in that sense that Rameses was defeated at
Qadesh. Muwatallish and Hatti had triumphed by
default!

82

AFTERMATH

In many accounts ofQadesh the events of Day 11
are presumed to have involved a resumption of the
battle. This derives from a particular interpretation
of the text of the Poem and assumes that the ene-
mies described therein are the Hit tites. There is
much however to suggest a different and more cred-
ible alternative. Far from identifying his enemies by
the standard formula employed in the inscriptions
of belonging to ‘the Fallen one of Haiti’, they are
described simply as ‘rebels’. Such a term is inappro-
priate to describe the Hittites and indeed nowhere

▼ By cutting off one
hand of a dead enemy
and presenting it as a tro-
phy to a scribe after the
battle , an Egyptian sol-
dier could demonstrate
his prowess in combat and
thus be awarded 'the gold
of valour'. On the right of
the photograph an Egyp-
tian infantryman is about
to take the right hand of a
dying Hit tile charioteer

while on the left a Sher-
den has just begun to hack
ofj the hand of a dead sol-
dier. The taking of hands
also allowed an assess-
ment of the enemy dead.

83

AFTERMATH

in any of the Rameside inscriptions are they
described as such. In reality, these rebels were none
other than the troops of Amun and P’Rc who, hav-
ing "abandoned" Rameses on ihe field of battle, had
broken ihe specific and reciprocal relationship that
existed between Pharaoh and his soldiers. Having
marshalled those whom he called ■rebels’ in ranks as
if for bailie, he states that: v.. My Majesty prevailed
against (hem and I killed among them and did not
relax, they sprawling before my horses and lying
down in their blood in one place’. Those whom
Rameses had killed were none other than his own
men! What is without doubt the earliest document-
ed

A Mir rite dead Utter the
field in another picture
taken from the Ramese-
um. This illustrates in
detail the flit tire 'field of
the dead 1 seen on the last
hut one p holograph, hut
extending above and to its

right . Careful scrutiny of
this picture mill place the
fore l egs o ) Ra n i eses * tea i > i
in the bottom left-hand
corner.

ed example of what the Romans referred to as "deci
mation’ was carried out on the Plain of Qadesh, in
all probability in full and intended view of
Muwatallish.

The Poem would have us believe that it was this

AFTERMATH

ruthless demonstration against his own troops that
led the Hittite king to proffer a truce to Rameses.
Notwithstanding the psychological impact the spec-
tacle must have made, Muwatallish clearly had his
own reasons for coming forward with the proposal.
The losses among his own chariot ry had been in the
primary offensive arm of the Hittite force. As such,
the impact on his chariot strength as well as on the
morale of the remaining chariot units must have
been profound. Even more so was the impact of the
loss of many of the leading men of the expedition in
the second wave* The premature initiation of battle
on the previous day now precluded his exploiting to
any advantage his early arrival at Qadesh* The
advent of the other Egyptian corps of Ptah and
Sutekh meant that Rameses now possessed a sizable
force, but not enough to force the issue and win any
battle that might now transpire. Gone to the winds
were pharaonic aspirations to invade northern Syria
at least in the short term! Qadesh was safe in
Hittite hands and as Rameses, given his losses, was
in no position to remain in Syria, he would have no
choice but to return to Egypt. Under such condi
lions Amurru would be bound to fall into the Hit

titc lap (indeed shortly thereafter Renteshina was
taken captive to Haiti). Why then expend men and
materiel if most of his strategic ambitions for this
campaign could be realized, albeit by default?
Indeed the Hittite monarch had every reason for
thinking that should Rameses accept his proposal.
Pharaoh would thus reveal his hand as one of weak-
ness! Furthermore, the maintenance of a Hittite
army in being w F as vital, for there can be no doubt-

▼ Some sixteen years
after Qadesh and the long
told war between the
Nilotic empire and that
of Haiti, a peace treaty
was concluded between
the two great powers .
Inscribed on silver tablets
the clauses, many per -
mining to the demarca-
tion of the boundary
between the respective
empires in Syria , was
concluded with the decla-
ration that they would
not go to war with each

other again. Of the bor-
ders in Syria , Egypt
accepted that Qadesh and
Amurru and the northern
lands were lost forever.
This is a graphic of a clay
tablet bearing a copy of
the treaty in Babylonian
cuneiform, the lingua
franca of diplomacy in
the Ancient Near East ,
which was uncovered at
the former Hittite capital
Halt us a s { Boga z hoy) in
modern Turkey.

_ ( v ./,w — ,

\^r m nm* ft

?*r mw**

itf 4 -

Pci

< M-

i“

i

-wm

-m

tuptiit p**.* wif

l Hr

#! at* r^K ^ 9 = 4 - **-

‘

r tfca. rtf !Mr Mr-

i$$i{ #r Mfiw ^4r4ff W NMf

m &

85

AFTERMATH

▼ Although the
common image of the
Egyptian foot soldier is
that seen on page 51, it
was the archers who
formed the most impor-
tant element of the Egyp-
tian army. Whereas aux-
iliary or mercenary

archers such as the
Nubians mainly
deployed the slave bow ,
by Qjidesh the standard
armament of the native
Egyptian foot archers
shown here and in the
chariotry was the com-
posite bow. /Modern
experiments with this
weapon indicate the
power of the Jire it could
bring down . Accurate to
f>0 metres , it had an
effective range of 175
metres and in the hands
of an exceptional shot
could reach as far as 500
metres. (Rob Chapman)

86

AFTERMATH

Aftermath

Carchemssh#

L I By year 1 Q t Pharaoh was
again fighting in Phoenicia,
Later Dapur to the north of
Gadesh, fell to Egyptian arms
There also exists the possibility
of a campaign as far north as
the borders of Kizzuwadna

Alaiakh « Aleppo
• Barga

Mediterranean
Sea n

Ugarif*

Simyra#

Uliaza#

Tunipi

Dapur*

• Qatna
Homs

It was the threat posed by a vigorous
and expansionist Assyria on Hatti's
eastern frontier that prompted the
approach by Hattushilish to Rameses
with a formal offer of peace. Amurru and
Oadesh were formally confirmed as
Hittite territories, The new border was
that as it existed before the battle some
seventeen years before. Peace between
Egypt and Hatti was confirmed in year
21 of the reign of Rameses II

- •Qadesh
• Ei-Qa

Bytalos •
Beirut#

Sidon*

Tyre# # Uzu

► Kuril eddi

LI In year 8, Rameses
launched an offensive in
Canaan to recover the
territories lost in the revolts

Akko
Megiddo*
Beth-Shan

#

i Damascus

Muwatallls followed
up the Egyptians and
occupied for a short
time the province of Upc

In the wake of the
Egyptian retreat Canaan
flared into open revolt

Gaza*

’.L

...

Memphis#

Pi-Rameses
(Avar is)

• Bile

$

$

0

I

25 50

* ►

75 100 Miles

■ i

0

1

50

IDO 150 Km

87

AFTERMATH

ing that Muwataliish was acutely conscious that the
vassal kingdoms of Anatolia and Syria in addition to
Adad-Nirari of Assyria were keenly awaiting reports
on the outcome of the battle. Ilatti had nothing to
gain by lighting on and much to gain by a cessation
of hostilities.

In the wake of the truce that followed Rameses
and his army repaired to Egypt, accompanied so it
is said by whistles and catcalls as they passed
through the towns of Canaan. As if to compound
the obvious Hittite advantage, Muwataliish trailed
the withdrawing Egyptian army and occupied,
albeit temporarily, the province of Upe. The news
of Qadesh, of the perceived failure of the Egyptian
army and the humiliation of the overbearing
Pharaoh as sufficient to raise the whole of Canaan in
revolt even as the army entered Egypt. Notwith-

standing the Egyptian recovery on the battlefield,
the fallout from Qadesh would result in Rameses
spending many years reimposing Egyptian rule in
Canaan and Syria.

When ultimately Egypt and Ilatti came to terms
in the twenty-first year of Rameses' reign, the terri-
torial settlement saw the Nilotic kingdom reconciled
to the permanent loss of Amurru, Qadesh and the
aspirations to northern Syria. Under the aegis of Re
and the Storm God of Hatti, the treaty was 4 ... to
make it a prosperous peace, and he shall make excel-
lent the brotherhood between the great king, the
king of Egypt, and the great king of Hatti, his
brother, for ever and ever!' Until the demise of the
Hittite empire in 1190, the treaty remained unbro-
ken and the Ancient Near East witnessed eighty
years of remarkable peace and prosperity.

^ It was in the thirty-
fourth year of Rameses ’
reign that he married the
daughter of Hattushilish
III. King of Hatti . An
outward sign of the stabil-
ity of Egypt ian-Hittite
accord , Pharaoh was in
his fifties when the mar-
riage union was conclud-
ed. While it is doubtful
that the Hittite king ever
visited Egypt, he is neces-
sarily shown with his
hands upraised in suppli-
cation with those of his
daughter as he approaches
Pharaoh. Even to the end
royal propagandists would
never suggest that
Pharaoh was anything
other than the superior
ruler. Rameses was evi-
dently very pleased with
his Hittite bride: 4 Her
[Egyptian] name was pro-
claimed as , “Queen
Maat-Hor-Nefrure ”, may
she live daughter of the
Great Ruler of Hatti, and
daughter of the Great
Queen of Hatti. * Egypt
and Hatti remained at
peace until the Sea Peo-
ples swept away the great
northern power in c.1190.

88

CHRONOLOGY

Notwithstanding the continuing debate concerning
the reliability of dating this period, the substance of
which falls outside the domain of this title, that
employed within is the same as used by the Cam-
bridge Indent History. This also allows continuity
with the chronology in the Osprey Elite title of New
Kingdom Egypt by the same author Readers should
be aware that whereas this places Qadesh in 1300,
ui her texts, using a lower' date, place it in approxi-
mately 1273.

£-.1674: The I Ivksos invaders take control of Lower
Egypt. Reduce rest of kingdom to vassaldom.
r.1570: Amosis crowned king. Establishes the 18th
Theban' Dynasty Continues war of liberation'
against the Hyksos.

£7.1565: Hyksos invaders finally cleared from Egypt.
The Nilotic kingdom becomes tacit overlord of
Canaan and the Levant as far north as the River
Euphrates.

£7.1546-1526: Possible military campaign by
Amenophis I in Syria.

ir.1525-r.12: Tuthmosis I leads the army into Syria
and engages the forces of a nascent Kingdom of
Mitanni. Sets up a stela on the banks of the
Euphrates. This marks the northernmost point of
Egyptian expansion in New Kingdom,
c. 1482-50: Tuthmosis III undertakes seventeen cam-
paigns in Canaan and Syria to impose Egyptian
rule. In his campaign of Year 33 Tuthmosis invades
Mitanni proper inflicting on that power a major
defeat that raises the prestige and reputation of the
Egyptian army to the foremost of that in the
Ancient Near East. Even before his death the power
of the Nilotic kingdom in Syria is on the wain in the
lace of a resurgent Mitanni.

C.1450-C.25: Amenophis II campaigns in northern
Syria in order to reassert Egyptian rule, but Mitanni
manages to retain dominance in the region. A resur-
gent Haiti prompts approaches by Mitanni to estab-

lish lasting "brotherhood’ with Egypt.
c 1425-17: Treaty between Egypt and Mitanni con-
cluded in reign of Tuthmosis IV. A clear demarca-
tion of their respective empires in central Syria is
the primary consequence. Egypt relinquishes claims
to its former northern territories. These borders are
viewed by Egypt as marking the true boundaries of
her empire in Asia. Two generations of peace follow.
c.1380-50: Under their king Suppiluliumas, in two
major wars the I lit tires effectively destroy the King-
dom of Mitanni and their northern Syrian empire.
Egypt loses Ugarit, Qadesh and Amurru. Egypt
now shares its northern borders with the Hittite
empire.

c 1320-18: The accession of Rameses I marks the
beginning of the 19th Dynasty and a commitment to
the recovery of Egypt’s lost' territories in Syria.
c.1318-04: Set i 1 begins the process of recovering
Qadesh and Amurru. Although the lauer territory
seems to have stayed firmly in the Hittite camp,
Qadesh is recovered by the new pharaoh for Egypt
for the last time. Nevertheless, il is recovered
through treaty by Hatti even before Seti’s death.
1304-01: Rameses II ascends the throne, but not
until 1301 does Bcnieshina, King of Amurru, repu-
diate his vassal treaty with Hatti and defect to
Egypt. A rapid campaign by Raineses in that year
draws Amurru firmly into the Egyptian camp,
Muwakillish, King of Hatti, prepares for war.

THE BATTLE OF QADESH
Day 9, second month of summer season. Year 5
(late April 1300): The Egyptian army leaves Egypt
to begin its march to Qadesh on the O routes.

Day 9, third month of summer season, Year 5 {late
May 1300): Rameses and the advance corps of
Amun encamp to the south of Qadesh. Unbeknown
to them the Hittite army is already encamped in the
vicinity. The Egyptians only become aware of their
presence in the evening when Hittite scouts are cap-

89

CHRONOLOGY

Lured and interrogated. Pharaoh dispatches Vizier
to hurry on the army.

Day 10: The corps of P'Re is attacked by a large
Hin ire reconnaissance detachment and blown to the
winds as ii marches across the Plain of Qadesh
heading for the camp of Raineses and Amun. The
Hit tile chariot force attacks the Egyptian camp,
lured by the great booty within. Ramoses manages
to save i he day w ith a small chariot detachment.
Having forced the Hittites to retire with great loss-
es, a relief Hittite force is dispatched by
Muwatallish across rhe Orontes to alleviate pressure
on the first force. As ihe second detachment attacks
Pharaoh’s camp they are themselves surprised by
the Ne’arin, a detached force of Egyptian and allied
charioLry The Hittites retreat leaving many dead.
Others drown at tempting to escape across the river.
The arrival of the corps of Ptah late in the day bol-

sters the strength of the Egyptian army at Qadesh.
Combat ceases.

Day 1 1 : Pharaoh, making an example of those
whom he believes to have shown cowardice on the
previous day, executes a large number of men from
the corps of Amun and P’Re in full view of the Hit-
tites. A truce offered by Muwatallish is accepted by
Rameses. The Egyptian Army retreats to Egypt and
the Hittites occupy the province of Upe* Virtually
the w hole empire in Canaan and Syria rises in rebel-
lion as (Qadesh is perceived as a major Hittite victo-
ry. Raineses spends many years reasserting Egyptian
rule in these territories.

<r.!283: Egypt and Hatti finally come to lerms and
settle their borders in Syria. Haiii retains Qadesh
and Amurru and both remain within the Hittite
empire until its demise in cA 190 ai ihe hands of
'The Sea Peoples’,

^Subsequent to the Bat-
tle of Qadesh the two
accounts which record the
event in some length
together with their sup *
porting pictorial reliefs
were recorded in multiple
copies on temples
throughout Egypt. The
ttPo accounts known as
the 'Bulletin 1 and the
'Poem ' were inscribed
seven and eight times
respectively at the R at pe-
seta n, Abydos, Kamuk,
Abu Simbel and here at
Luxor . They are the main
source for the battle .

90

A GUIDE TO
FURTHER READING

Alhkkd, Cyril, The Egyptians. Thames & Hudson,
1984

Baines win Maleic Atlas of Ancient Egypt,
Equinox Books, 1983

Cambridge Ancient History. Part 11, 2 A, 1975
Gardiner, Sir Alan. The Kadesh Inscriptions of
Rameses IL Ashmolean Museum, 1960
Goedicke, Hans (ed). Perspectives on the Battle of
Kadesh. Halgo Inc, 1985

Gi rnky, 0,R. The T1 suites. Penguin Books, 1952

Kitchen, K . Pharaoh Triumphant r Aris & Phillips
Ltd, 1982

MaCquken, J G. The l Unites. Thames & 1 Iudson,
1975

Ml rnane, W.J. The Road to Qadesh . University of
Chicago, 1985

Newby, PI I. The Warrior Pharaohs. Faber, 1980
Redegrd, HB* PgypL Canaan and Israel in Ancient
Times* Princeton University Press, 1992

91

WARGAMING QADESH

If one chooses to wargame the whole campaign of
Year 5, then certainly an interesting map game
should result. Also several ‘Committee games’
could be staged with the players representing
Pharaoh and his divisional commanders, or
Muwatallish and his allies and vassals. Arguments
on the Egyptian side should revolve around
whether to direct the main effort up the Beka’a
valley (as in the historical prototype) or along the
coast (as in the campaign of the previous year) or
split the effort between the two. On the Hittitc side
it might be a question of whether to approach the
wargame more aggressively, and perhaps advance
the army south of Qadesh.

Of course if the players are allowed free rein in
this, then the chances of their campaign culmina-
ting in a battle bearing much resemblance to the
historical Qadesh are slim. For those interested in
logistics, however, this may not be too great a
sacrifice, and such questions as ‘What is the
maximum load and speed of a baggage donkey?’
may for some have a fascination of their own.
(About 1001b and 2mph incidentally!)

If it is desired to refight the whole campaign
rather than just the battle of Qadesh, then study of
recent Arab-Israeli Wars and, more particularly,
Allenby’s Palestine campaign of 1917-18 would
pay dividends. If one wanted to disguise the
scenario, then a 1917 setting with Turkish and
British or ANZAC cavalry replacing the chariots
would fit the bill.

The Eve of Battle

Much of what was said above can be applied to the
situations of the two armies the night before the
battle. Committee games could be staged which
could result in the manner of the Egyptian advance
being changed: perhaps Pharaoh would be per-
suaded to be more cautious. Similarly the Hittites

might opt for a more conventional battle line.
Perhaps Qadesh itself might be stormed. But all
these options would lose the flavour of the
historical battle, and that would be a pity because it
is virtually unique in ancient military history. Let
us therefore assume that the wargamers wish to
re fight only the battle of Qadesh itself - or that tin-
campaign umpire has so contrived the committee
games as to drive them willy-nilly to the vicinity of
Qadesh in the dispositions - both physical and
mental - of their historical counterparts!

The Battle Itself

Because of the arrival on the battlefield of so many
forces not present at the start of the action, at
different times and from different directions, and
the consequent ‘see-sawing’ of the fortunes of
battle, Qadesh presents a most interesting recre-
ation for the wargamer. It is far more interesting
than the stereotyped line-ups of Greek and Roman
battlefields, and in fact has more the flavour of
many Napoleonic battles, with the Emperor’s
Grand Tactical design of the concentration of
separately marching corps on the battlefield itself.
We should always bear in mind that Napoleon
planned things this way, while for Rameses it was
rather more in the nature of fortuitous accident.
But the end result is the same: a ding-dong, to-
and-fro battle, which should allow an exciting
boardgame or tabletop game with miniatures.

Bearing the above in mind, it is most important
to set up the wargame in such a way that the
essential flavour of the historical battle is retained.
In his book Ancient Battles for Wargamers (Argus
Books, 1977) the late Charles Grant described a
refight of Qadesh in which the division of P’Re
turned to face the Hittite ambushing force and,
after a hard slog, beat them off virtually unaided!
Most sets of wargame rules will (rightly) classify

92

WARGAMING QADESH

the Egyptians as regular, well-trained troops of
average or above average morale and - unless
some special ‘Qadesh factors’ are grafted on to
commercial rules - the above misfortune could
befall any tabletop relight.

How can we be sure that our wargame will
retain the essential features - and thus the
excitement - of the battle, and not degenerate into
just another nondescript ‘Egyptians versus Hit-
tites’ game? The answer is to begin in the middle.
Do not start the game with the 1 Iittite chariot force
bursting from cover to attack the flank of P’Re
division. Start the game with P’Re and Amun
already in rout - indeed most of them already
routed out of the area represented by the tabletop;
with the Hittite chariots scattered in pursuit, many
of them approaching Pharaoh’s camp; and with
Rameses and his small force of Royal chariots and
Sherden infantry ready to resist the onslaught. 'To
be sure that they are not too easily overwhelmed
(as in reality they were not) though seemingly so
heavily outnumbered (as in reality they were) we
must pay particular attention to the moral and
physical state of the different bodies of troops
involved in the battle at this point, and of those
who arc to enter the tabletop battlefield in the
ensuing turns, and make sure that the rules we are
using reflect them accurately.

But first let us consider the tabletop battlefield
itself. Who is on it at the start of the battle, and
who is going to enter it subsequently?

The Battlefield

First it should be a fairly long tabletop, not less
than 12ft by 6ft for 25mm scale miniatures. The
southern end of the table would represent a line
above the northern edge of the forest of Robawi.
The Egyptian division of Ptah should ulti-
mately enter the battlefield here. Pharaoh’s camp
should be near, but not on, the northern edge of
the table. The Sherden should be in the camp and
Pharaoh’s Royal chariotry just outside it, to the
north. The Ne’arin troops should subsequently
arrive in the north-west corner of the battlefield
and any rallied units of the Amun and P’Re
divisions should return via the northern edge.

The eastern side of the table would roughly

denote the course of the River Orontes. The
second force of Hittite chariots, 1,000 strong,
should enter the battlefield here, just north of
Qadesh, which can be represented on this edge of
the table — or may be assumed to be just off-table if
no suitable model is available. If Qadesh itself is
represented, then obviously part of the Orontes
will also have to be represented in this corner of
the table, in which case Muwatallish and the main
body of Hittite and allied infantry can also be put
on-table for visual effect.

Apart from Pharaoh and his Household troops,
the only Egyptians on the table at the start of the
game should be some scattered remnants of P’Re
division. Not all of this division would have fled
northward through Pharaoh’s camp. Strung out on
the march, the tail of the column would more likely
flee south towards the protection of the Ptah
division; the centre of the column probably west-
ward directly away from the immediate threat of
the Hittite chariotry'. Those chariots would also
have spread out in pursuit of the scattered
Egyptians, with probably most (but certainly not
all) of them swinging north towards the Royal
camp.

Let us now look at each force in turn and
consider whether any special rules need to be
devised to cater for its part in the battle.

The Forces

First, the Hittite ambush force of 2,500 chariots.
(By the end of the battle the Egyptians had
captured plenty of Hittite and allied leaders of high
rank to interrogate, so we can be fairly sure that
this figure is reasonably accurate. When exaggera-
ting the Egyptian records of Qadesh usually refer
to ‘millions’ or ‘hundreds of thousands’, ‘2500’ is
sufficiently conservative to have the ring of truth!)
It was for long thought that the 1 Iittite chariots had
a crew of three men. This belief was based solely
on a misinterpretation of the Egyptian records of
Qadesh. The key passage {Kadesh Inscriptions of
Rameses If Sir Alan Gardiner, Oxford, 1960 p. 85)
is: ‘and he [Pharaoh] found 2,500 chariots hem-
ming him in on his outer side, consisting of all the
champions of the fallen ones of Khatti . . . they
being three men on a chariot acting as a unit . . .’.

93

WARGAMING QAOESH

Reading Gardiner’s notes on this passage, we lind
that ‘consisting of could equally well he ‘with’;
‘champions’ is literally ‘runners’ [i.e., light in-
fantry!; and ‘acting as a unit’ is literally ‘they made
unilings’. Now to us as military historians this
phrase makes perfect sense: the Mittite chariotry
‘made unitings’ with their supporting light in-
fantry, ‘they being three men on a chariot’ (but
only two of them charioteers). (A depiction of a
Hittite chariot by the llittites themselves, dis-
covered in Anatolia since Breasted’s original
translation of the Egyptian reliefs, shows only two
crewmen.) To allow the infantry supports to keep
pace with the chariots in their rapid advance
against the flank of P’Re division, and subse-
quently on to Raineses’ camp, they had to ‘hitch a
ride’ (infantry' were still doing it in the Second
World War, on the backs of advancing tanks!).

This presents us with a problem, for virtually all
commercial sets of wargame rules have no mech-
anism to adequately represent this tactic. Grafting
on such a rule is usually very difficult because
commercial rules usually have different ratios for
the different arms. For example, in the popular
Wargame Research Group rules 1 model infantry
figure represents 20 real infantry, but 1 model
chariot represents only 5 real ones; so one model
infantry figure would have to support four model
chariots - a difficult prospect! Probably the best
solution is to go back to wargaming’s ‘cottage
industry’ roots and devise your own set of rules
from scratch!

I listorically it is quite possible (perhaps prob-
able) that the morale of P’Re division cracked
before the Hittite chariot force made contact with it.
(Gardiner concedes that Ifis translation [the Hittite
chariotryl ‘broke into’ [P’Re) could equally be
rendered ‘overwhelmed’.) This would explain why
fugitives, most of whom would have been on foot,
were able to flee through Pharaoh’s camp before
the Hittite chariotry reached it - to do that they
would have needed a head start!

For the purposes of our game it also means that
a very large proportion of P’Re division, as well as
the whole of Amun division, should be available
for rallying should Pharaoh with his bodyguards
and the freshly arrived Ne’arin troops do enough
to stem the tide of the I littite advance. Each move,

a morale test should be carried out for Egyptian
units assumed to be routed off the northern edge
of the board at the start of the game. The chances
of their rallying and returning to battle should
increase with each move that Pharaoh and the
Ne’arin hold back the Hittite chariotry. However,
should the l littites be able to exit chariot units off
the northern end of the board (simulating con-
tinuing pursuit) then the chances of the Egyptian
troops rallying would be diminished.

Many commentators have expressed incredulity
at Ramuses’ overthrow of the Hittite chariotry with
so small a force. If we were considering a force of
2,500 fresh Hittite chariots, then such expressions
would doubtless be correct. But that is a descrip-
tion of the Hittite chariots as they burst forth from
behind Qadesh, where they had been hidden in
ambush after crossing from the east side of the
Orontes. After a fast cantor (if not a hard gallop) -
and some scattering - in pursuit of P’Re, it would
be a diminished Hittite chariot force, coming up
piecemeal with blown horses, which confronted
the Pharaoh. We need not doubt Raineses’ claim
that he charged six times into battle. His body-
guard were elite troops; their horses were rested;
coming up in a succession of straggling groups, the
enemy chariots would almosl certainly give way
before them. As long as the Egyptians kept their
formation and their discipline and did not
succumb to pushing their pursuit too far, they
would be able to rally and charge again. Nor must
we forget the lure ol the camp and its booty to
distract many of the I Unites.

So, for the purposes of our game, the rules
should give the Egyptian Royal bodyguard the
following advantages: a morale bonus for being
elite troops commanded by their sovereign in
person; a bonus in melee for the same reasons; and
a movement bonus for having fresh horses -
probably the best horses in the Egyptian army. The
Hittite chariotry' should have a movement penalty
for having tired horses; and a consequent morale
penalty should they be charged while in such a
state. The rules should allow chariot units lo stand
and ‘breathe’ their horses, which after a certain
number of turns would then he fit enough to move
and charge again without penalty .

Also at this stage of the game any Hittite chariot

94

WARGAMING QADESH

unit coming near the Egyptian camp, but not
within charge reach of Egyptian chariots, should
have to take a morale test to see if they lose their
discipline and start to loot the camp. Most rules
have an ‘uncontrolled advance’ or similar category'
in their morale tables. Such a result in this instance
would mean that that unit started looting. Looters
should suffer very severe penalties in both morale
and melee if attacked by either the Sherden troops
in the camp or the Ne’arin troops when they arrive
on the tabletop.

This brings us to the question of the Ne’arin.
Just who they w ere has been a fraught question for
Egyptologists. It is important for us to know for the
purposes of the game, so that we can represent
them with the correct troop types. The force has
been variously identified as Asiatic auxiliaries or as
the division of Sutekh, but with no evidence to
support either contention. The line in the poem,
‘and I lis Majesty had made the first battle-force
out of all the leaders of his army, and they w'erc
upon the shore of the land of Amor’, provides the
best evidence. It would have been possible for
Rameses to have split his force and send a
detachment north via the coastal route into the
land of Amor upon leaving Egypt. But such a force
could not have been composed ‘out of all the
leaders of his army’, because we know that he had
his I Iousehold troops w ith him in his camp by
Qadesh. Nor does the description fit the division
of Sutekh, let alone Asiatic allies. The only logical
time - indeed the only possible time - for Rameses
to have left a composite force of his elite troops on
the coast of Amor was at the end of the previous
year’s campaign, when the main army retired to
winter quarters in Egypt. At the start of the next
campaign these troops would be ordered to
rendezvous w ith the main army at Qadesh.

For the purposes of our wargamc, then, we must
make the Ne’arin an elite and veteran force, with
advantages in discipline and morale. This may also
help explain the panic in the divisions of P’Re and
Amun. If they had been stripped of many of their
best soldiers at the end of the previous campaign,
they would probably contain a higher than usual
proportion of raw recruits, raised during the winter
to fill the ranks. Anyone opting to begin refighting
the battle of Qadesh from its historical start point

(the surprise attack by the I Iittite chariots) should
particularly note this possibility and give P’Re and
Amun some morale disadvantages to reflect it.

Let us now look briefly at the second I Iittite
chariot force. The records tell us that it was 1 ,000
strong, and that its various contingents were led by
many high-ranking I Iittites (often of Royal blood)
and allied chieftains. (Significantly they make no
mention of three men per chariot w'hen describing
this force.) For the purposes of the wargame we
should consider this force to be elite and therefore
of high morale; not as well coordinated as the
Egyptian forces, because of its polyglot compo-
sition; and unsupported by light infantry.

The final force we need to consider is the
division of Ptah, which came up from the south.
This would be a composite force of ehariotry and
infantry', like the other divisions. It too may have
had some of its best troops seconded at the end of
the previous campaign and replaced by recruits.
Much has been made by commentators of the
seemingly long time it took Ptah to reach Rameses,
and discussion of this has always centred around
how far south the unit must have been for it to
have taken this time to come up. But all these
computations have been geared to route marching
rates of troops not in the presence of enemy forces.
It is almost certain that the plain south of Qadesh
and Rameses’ camp w'ould be swarming with
Hittite ehariotry. Ptah would therefore have had to
move north in battle formation, continually skir-
mishing with groups of I Iittites. Advancing in such
conditions w'ould undoubtedly be a slow process. If
your wargames table is long enough, then the Ptah
division could be deployed on-table from the start,
fighting its own battle towards the Royal camp.

The Players

The game would be best played w ith at least three
Egyptian commanders: Pharaoh, commanding his
I Iousehold troops and any Amun or P’Re troops
returning to the northern edge of the board; the
commander of the Ne’arin troops, arriving at the
north-west corner of the board fairly early in the
battle; and the Vizier leading on the division of
Ptah (and also taking under command any scat-
tered remnants of P’Re that remain to the south).

95

WARGAMING QADESH

The Hittites would also he handled best by at
least three commanders: two with the first force of
chariots and light infantry, one to handle events in
the north against the Egyptian camp, the other in
the south opposing the advance of Ptah; the third
player would control the second force of chariots.

The game would be balanced if the arrival times
of the initially off-table force were fixed by a non-
playing umpire but not communicated to the
players, so that an element of surprise remained.
Otherwise, certainly if a non-playing umpire were
not possible, the arrival times for these forces
would have to be set out in a timetable, but with
possible delays subject to some chance factor so
that things would not he too predictable for the
players.

Widening the Scope

Two forces not considered here are the main body
of Hittiie infantry (37,000 strong according to the
Egyptian records) and the division of Sutekh.
Neither made it to the historical battlefields; nor is
there much chance of either making it on to a
tabletop refight that adheres reasonably closely to
the prototype. Most commentators accept that
Sutekh was too far south to reach the battle in
time. A few without a shred of evidence in support,
equate it with the Ne’arin.

If we want to enter the realm of conjecture here
is a suggestion that has some I.M.P. (Inherent
Military Possibility in this case - to say Probability
would be rather rash). Suppose that the Sutekh
division carried on along the east hank of the
Orontes, moving for a while due east before
swinging back north. Two points could lend some
support to such a theory. First the city of Qadesh
was the main aim of the campaign. It had formerly
been an Egyptian vassal but had gone over to the
1 Iittite alliance. It was a politically influential state,
and its geographical position made it a very
important communications centre. The Egyptians
wanted it back, and to isolate it they would
ultimately have needed a force to block the eastern
approaches on the other side of the Orontes.
Second, the approach of such a force on the east
bank of the river would provide a better reason for
the seeming immobility of the main I Iittite infantry

than any yet put forward. Wargaming is all about
‘What if?’, so we could certainly refight a Qadesh
incorporating such dispositions on a somewhat
larger tabletop or board. The game would then
need at least one more player on each side - and
would give the umpire a few more headaches in
sorting out his timetable.

Whether the desultory fighting of the following
day is worth wargaming would obviously depend
on how closely the wargame had followed the
historical prototype. Perhaps another ‘Committee
game’ could be staged to allow the plavers
themselves to decide if it would be worthwhile to
resume the tabletop action.

Hardware

Qadesh has been produced as a boardgame. It
appeared in issue 7 of the American Command
Magazine (Nov-Dee 1990). A sheet of 108 die-cut
cardboard counters and a 34in x 22in mapboard
are provided as inserts; the rules are an integral
part of the magazine, which also carries an article
providing background information. Some of the
background information may be erroneous, the
map may he rather bland, and a few of the counters
may represent units that are conjectural rather
than historical; but you are W'argamers! A couple of
test plays, a few changes here and there and you
will get a reasonable game out of it! The main
criticism of the rules as they stand is that they
make for a very slow game.

Miniatures are available in 25mm scale from a
few manufacturers, notably I linchcliffe Models,
now available from Ellerburn Armies, Boxtree,
Thornton Dale, near Pickering, North Yorks
Y018 7SD; Garrison Figures, now available from
S.K.T., 9 Wargrave Road, Twyford, Reading,
Berks. RG10 9NY; and Essex Miniatures, Unit 1,
Shannon Centre, Shannon Square, Thames
Estuary Estate, Carney Island, Essex SS8 OPE.
The choice of Egyptians is fairly good; the Hittites
are very sparsely covered. In 15mm, Donnington
Miniatures, 15 Cromwell Road, Shaw', Newbury,
Berks. RG13 2HE and Chariot Miniatures, 25
Broad Mead, Luton, Beds. LU3 1RX have ranges.

96

THE WARRIOR

PHARAOH

Perhaps history’s first great battle,

Qadesh pitted the two great warriors
of the age against each other, Muwatallish
of Hatti and the great Warrior- Pharaoh
Rameses II. Egypt’s revival under the
New Kingdom pharaohs was bound to
bring her into conflict with her neighbour
and in the event this key battle could have
gone either way. With the Hittites gaining
the initial advantage by surprising the
Egyptians, all seemed lost until Rameses
himself led his personal followers into the
fray, throwing back the Hittite chariots.

In spite of the appearance of Egyptian
reinforcements, the bravery of the
pharaoh and the tactically superior
showing of the Egyptian chariots, the
dislocation of his army dashed Rameses’s
wider strategic aspirations.

Author: Mark Healy was bom in 1953
and has a Master's degree in Political
Theology. He has written a number of
Osprey titles on both the ancient and
modern periods.

visit Osprey at wvyw.ospreypublishing.com

OSPREY

HISTORY